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I. INTRODUCTION 
An increasing number of governments are characterizing 
climate change as a threat to national security.  More specifically, 
governments are identifying some of the consequences of climate 
change, such as damage to military and strategic infrastructure 
caused by extreme weather activity and rising sea level, as 
constituting direct threats to national security; and they are 
identifying as indirect threats other consequences of climate 
change, such as the increased interstate tension and armed 
conflict likely to result from the shifting availability of water and 
fertile land, increasing migration flows, and other major climate-
based causes of socio-economic and political disruption. 1   In 
addition, there is the growing awareness that under certain 
predictive models, based on current projections of greenhouse 
gas (“GHG”) emissions and consequent temperature rise, 
climate change may constitute a threat to our civilization, and 
over the longer term, even humanity itself.2  As a result, there 
 
1 See infra Part II(A). 
2 See Kurt M. Campbell & Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change 
in Perspective, in CLIMATIC CATACLYSM:  THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 14 (Kurt Campbell ed., 2008); and see generally 
infra Part II(A). 
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have been some calls for the U.N. Security Council, the 
international institution with primary responsibility for 
addressing international peace and security, to take up climate 
change as an issue.3  But as dire as some of the climate change 
models are, most publics around the world have yet to 
comprehend the full magnitude of the looming crisis.4  Thus, 
even those governments that have expressed grave concern 
about the looming danger have had difficulty implementing 
costly mitigation policies.5  The nature of the threat posed by the 
crisis has not yet become politically salient, and the 
international law regimes related to international peace and 
security have not yet been implicated by calls for action on 
climate change. 
In this article I suggest that this is likely to change, and 
possibly change quite radically, in the not too distant future.  As 
the consequences of the climate change crisis begin to manifest 
themselves in ever worsening ways, the relationship between 
climate change and national security will become much more 
viscerally understood, not only by governments, but also by the 
general public in countries around the world.  The ignorance, 
denial, and apathy that has characterized most public responses 
to climate change will be replaced by fear, a sense of crisis, and 
escalating demands that governments take urgent action.  In the 
face of massive migration, pandemics, and increasing conflicts 
over the shifting availability of water and food, tribalism and 
nationalism will increase.  We are already seeing early trends in 
this direction in response to immigration pressures.6  States will 
 
3  See Michael Ramsden, “Uniting for Peace” and Humanitarian Intervention:  The 
Authorising Function of the U.N. General Assembly, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 267, 267 (2016); 
see infra Part III(A). 
4 Surveys suggest that there is fairly high awareness of the issue in developed countries, 
but that concern lags behind awareness rates, and the issue is a high political priority 
in very few countries.  See, e.g., Global Survey:  Where in the World is Most and Least 
Aware of Climate Change, CARBON BRIEF (July 27, 2015), https://www. 
carbonbrief.org/global-survey-where-in-the-world-is-most-and-least-aware-of-climate-
change [https://perma.cc/T62F-TTUF]. 
5 France is the most obvious recent example of this.  See, e.g., Elisabeth Zerofsky, The 
Complicated Politics of the Gilet Jaunes Movement, NEW YORKER (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-complicated-politics-of-the-gilets-
jaunes-movement [https://perma.cc/7PDY-L6HW]. 
6 See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Populism on the March:  Why the West is in Trouble, 95 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2016 at 9, 14–15. 
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begin to see not only the consequences but also the causes of 
climate change as a national security threat.  That is, they will 
begin to view those countries that are recklessly contributing to 
climate change, in flagrant violation of their international 
climate change law obligations—what we may for short call a 
“climate rogue state”—as also constituting a very specific threat 
to national security. 
The law will provide the criteria and legitimizing framework 
for characterizing such climate rogue states.  The international 
climate law regime, comprised of a growing body of treaties and 
customary international law, provides a web of increasingly 
specific obligations of both conduct and result in relation to the 
mitigation of GHG emissions, reducing the destruction of carbon 
sinks, and other contributions to climate change. 7   States 
already have clear obligations to reduce their contributions to 
climate change, to cooperate with other states in order to achieve 
the collective climate change objectives committed to in a 
number of treaties, and to prevent activity within their 
jurisdiction that would cause significant harm to other states 
and the global commons.8  At the same time, the response to 
climate change at both the domestic and the international level 
has been hampered by the complexity and cost of required action, 
the psychological inability of publics to fully comprehend the 
magnitude of the threat or the urgent need for action, the 
differentiated vulnerability to and perceived responsibility for 
the crisis, and the enormous collective action and free-rider 
problems involved.9  These problems are exacerbated by ideas of 
national sovereignty, and the notion that states are free under 
international law to choose whether and to what degree they will 
cooperate in collective efforts to address the threat.10  Thus, the 
climate change legal regime is not currently mobilizing 
 
7 See infra Part II(B). 
8 See id. 
9 See generally, e.g., GLOBAL COMMONS, DOMESTIC DECISIONS (Kathryn Harrison & Lisa 
McIntosh Sundstrom eds., 2010); FRANK P. INCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE:  A WICKED 
PROBLEM (2016). 
10 Epitomized most recently by President Bolsonaro of Brazil.  Dom Phillips, Bolsonaro 
Declares ‘the Amazon is ours’ and Calls Deforestation Data ‘Lies’, GUARDIAN (July 19, 
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/19/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-amazon-ra 
inforest-deforestation [https://perma.cc/5Z52-JAWW]. 
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sufficient compliance to meet our climate change objectives and 
forestall the coming crisis, but it is sufficiently well developed 
for us to identify recklessly excessive contributions to the 
problem and flagrant violations of the legal obligations.11  As the 
crisis deepens and the threat is more acutely felt, the tolerance 
for such conduct will diminish.  Under public pressure 
governments are going to call upon the international community 
to take collective action against climate rogue states in order to 
mitigate the threat they pose, by coercing the rogue state back 
into compliance with its international climate change law 
obligations.12 
I suggest that as the consequences of the crisis intensify over 
the coming decades, there will be increasing arguments that the 
U.N. Security Council should formally declare the conduct of 
climate rogue states as comprising a threat to international 
peace and security under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, and that 
the Security Council not only provide authorization for collective 
action such as increasingly punitive economic sanctions, but 
that it go so far as to authorize the threat or use of force under 
Article 42 of the Charter.13  If and when that fails, the pressure 
will mount for the legitimization of unilateral action against 
climate rogue states.  A road-map for how such claims will likely 
develop is provided by the arguments advanced over the last two 
decades for adjusting the jus ad bellum regime to permit the use 
of force in response to purportedly new and novel threats, such 
as the development of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”), 
the harboring of transnational terrorists, emerging cyber attack 
capability, and humanitarian crises.14  We can foresee a day 
when there will similarly be pressure on the jus ad bellum 
regime to adapt in ways that would permit collective action in 
the absence of U.N. Security Council authority—either through 
the expansion of the right of collective self-defense, or the 
creation of a new exception to permit collective but unilateral 
“atmospheric intervention.”15 
 
11 See id. 
12 See infra Part II(C). 
13 See infra Part III(A). 
14 See infra Part III(B). 
15 Id. 
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How would such a use of force actually be executed?  By way 
of illustration, let us consider a possible hypothetical scenario in 
2030.  The Brazilian government has remained in the hands of 
the Social Liberal Party since Jair Bolsonaro won the presidency 
in 2018.  It has continued to reject the validity of climate change 
science, and to promote policies that have markedly increased 
Brazil’s contribution to climate change—both through the direct 
production of GHG emissions, and by allowing an accelerating 
deforestation of the Amazon rain forest.16  Brazil missed by wide 
margins its 2025 and 2030 targets under the Paris Climate 
Agreement, and it is increasingly adopting policies that violate 
the object and purpose of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) regime.  The new 
president, elected in 2028, doubled down on these policies by 
announcing the construction of new coal-fired power plants, and 
the elimination of virtually all regulations prohibiting the 
deforestation of huge swathes of the Amazon. 
In the face of mounting international outrage, the U.N. 
Security Council took up the issue in 2028.  The Security Council 
passed a resolution recognizing that the destruction of the 
Amazon would pose a threat to international peace and security, 
condemned the recent policy announcements, and authorized 
economic sanctions against Brazil.  But it could not agree on 
authorizing any further action, given that several permanent 
members are also offside their own obligations.  Increasingly, 
severe economic sanctions have not altered Brazilian policy in 
the year and a half since they were initiated, and the first of the 
new coal-fired plants is nearing completion.  The Brazilian 
government has used the global criticism and sanctions to 
inflame nationalist passions within Brazil, and thereby deflect 
public focus from its own failings.  In the United States, there is 
an unprecedented climate refugee crisis emanating from South 
and Central America, with the media daily covering scenes of 
hundreds of thousands of desperate migrants being held at bay 
by armed troops at the Southern border.  The entire region is 
 
16 For Brazil’s current contributions, and the allocation between GHG emissions and 
land use, see The Carbon Brief Profile: Brazil, CARBON BRIEF (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-brazil [https://perma.cc/4L24-47Z 
F]. 
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beset with fear and anxiety over mounting droughts, sea-level 
rise, and extreme weather events.  The public pressure for action 
is irresistible.  Governments eager to deflect attention from their 
own past failures to address the crisis leap at the chance to 
scapegoat Brazil, calling its Amazon policy a threat to the “lungs 
of the planet” and characterizing the country as a “climate rogue 
state.”  A coalition of Organization of American States countries 
led by the United States threatens Brazil with military action if 
it does not move to protect the Amazon and suspend plans to 
commission the coal-fired energy plants.  The Brazilian 
government, now boxed in by its nationalist stance, rebuffs the 
demands.  At 0300 hours on a Sunday morning, when no civilian 
workers are likely to be present, an American Zumwalt-class 
stealth destroyer several hundred miles North of the Brazilian 
State of Maranhão, fires five cruise missiles towards the São 
Luis power plant complex.  They strike with great precision, 
destroying not only two of the plants under construction, but also 
incapacitating a 360 MW coal-fired plant that has been 
operating in São Luis since 2013.17   There is outrage inside 
Brazil and very mixed reactions around the world, but the U.S. 
led coalition relies on recent developments in the jus ad bellum 
regime to provide legal justifications for its use of force, and 
threatens to escalate such action if the Brazilian government 
does not adjust its policies. 
In thinking about how and in what possible way the jus ad 
bellum regime could be adjusted to authorize such a strike, it 
will be objected that the novel threats posed by nuclear 
proliferation, transnational terrorism, or cyber attacks are 
qualitatively different from the threat posed by the 
consequences or causes of climate change.  While the use of force 
in response to these other threats may have stretched the 
doctrine of self-defense, the use of force in response to excessive 
contributions to climate change is entirely beyond the scope of 
self-defense and could only be justified, if at all, in terms of 
something like the doctrine of necessity—and of course necessity 
is no justification for a use of force in either domestic or 
 
17 For a map of current and future coal-fired generating plants, see Mapped: The World’s 
Coal Power, CARBON BRIEF (March 25, 2019), https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-
worlds-coal-power-plants (last visited March 3, 2020). 
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international law. 18   Indeed, most readers will recall the 
nineteenth century case R. v. Dudley and Stephens, which 
involved murder charges against the captain and first-mate of a 
shipwrecked vessel for killing and eating the hapless cabin boy 
while stranded at sea in a lifeboat.19  The court emphatically 
rejected the argument that necessity was a defense to the charge 
of murder, and established the principle that has held sway in 
the common law world ever since—a principle that similarly 
holds in international law—that necessity, as a concept separate 
and distinct from the principle of self-defense, is no justification 
for the lethal use of force. 20   However, the court went to 
significant pains to highlight that the cabin boy, Richard Parker, 
had offered no threat whatsoever to his killers.  He was entirely 
innocent, and they killed him purely for the purpose of 
consuming him, not because he had created or increased any risk 
to their lives.  But what if they had killed Parker not merely to 
eat him, but because Parker had been actively doing something 
that slowly increased the risk of death for all of them?  What if 
Parker had irrationally attempted to throw their only drinking 
water overboard?  Would that start to move the principle of 
necessity into the realm of self-defense, or at least blur the lines 
between necessity and self-defense?  I will explore below how 
recent arguments to expand the doctrine of self-defense in 
international law, in order to respond to allegedly new and novel 
threats, both blur the line between necessity and self-defense, 
and are likely to be employed in the context of climate change in 
ways that are likely to find traction as the crisis deepens. 
Today, in 2020, such claims will surely sound radical, even 
dangerous—radical in the sense that it seems unrealistic to 
think that countries would contemplate the use, or threat, of 
force in order to enforce compliance with climate change law 
obligations; and dangerous to suggest that the arguments 
supporting such a threat or use of force might find some 
 
18 For the international law principle, see JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY:  
THE GENERAL PART 274-80, 305-15 (2013); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work 
of Its Fifty-Third Session, at art. 25, U.N. Doc. A1/56/10 (2001). 
19 R v. Dudley and Stephens, [1881–85] All ER Rep. 61, (QBD, UK). 
20 See infra Part II(B). 
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legitimacy.21  Dangerous, indeed, to even voice ideas that could 
serve to further weaken and undermine the jus ad bellum 
regime’s limits on the use of force, and to provide yet more 
pretexts for states to engage in armed conflict.  To be very clear, 
I am not making a normative argument that the jus ad bellum 
regime should be adjusted to recognize and enable such 
collective action in the future.  I am making two main sets of 
claims.  The first is primarily predictive:  if the international 
community fails to mitigate climate change in accordance with 
our treaty objectives, and the harm resulting from the climate 
change crisis thus worsens and prompts states to view the 
causes of climate change as threats to national security, then 
there will be increasing calls for collective action against climate 
rogue states; and that this will ultimately result in pressure on 
the jus ad bellum regime to justify the threat or use of force 
against such states.  What is more, when compared to recent 
arguments for relaxing the jus ad bellum limits on the use of 
force to address other new and novel threats, the arguments that 
are likely to be advanced in the climate change context are more 
compelling and reasonable.22 
My second set of claims are normative.  First, I primarily 
argue that now is the time to start thinking and talking about 
these issues.  If there is some reasonable chance that the jus ad 
bellum regime will come under pressure to permit the threat or 
use of force against climate rogue states, we need to begin 
thinking now about whether such pressure should be resisted, 
and how any adaptations to the regime should be shaped and 
limited, before the sense of crisis is more urgent and any new 
policy is forged in a state of fear.23  I am sensitive to the idea that 
it may be irresponsible for scholars to explore arguments that 
run the risk of normalizing and legitimating legal justifications 
for the kind of state action that would now be unlawful and 
illegitimate. 24   But in my view, these arguments will be 
 
21 While radical, such arguments are not entirely unprecedented.  See, e.g., Adam Betz, 
Preventative Environmental Wars, 18 J. MIL. ETHICS 223 (2019). 
22 See infra Part III(A). 
23 See infra Part IV. 
24 There is also the risk that making such arguments can influence current politics in 
counterproductive ways.  See, e.g., Alonso Gurmendi, New Rule:  Let’s Not Invade the 
Amazon, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 7, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/08/07/new-rule-lets-
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forthcoming when the pressure mounts regardless, and the 
greater risk is to remain willfully blind to the issues until the 
eleventh hour, when states begin to contemplate action.  This is 
not to let out of the bottle a genie that would otherwise never be 
liberated.  This is about identifying the genie now, and figuring 
out how to harness and limit the harm it can cause before fearful 
states look to the genie for answers. 
What is more, while this article is primarily aimed at 
initiating a debate on these issues, my preliminary contribution 
to that debate, and my second normative claim, is to suggest that 
the coming efforts to adjust the jus ad bellum regime should be 
largely resisted and rejected.  While I explore how the 
arguments marshalled in support of those efforts will be 
powerful and why they will likely gain traction, I also argue that, 
on balance, any such relaxation of the standards of jus ad bellum 
would dangerously worsen some of the existing weaknesses of 
the regime.  Moreover, it would compound some of the injustices 
that already characterize the climate change crisis in ways that 
are counterproductive to the entire climate change effort, and 
ultimately undermine the international rule of law.  It is 
important to recognize both their power and the risks of these 
arguments, precisely so that we may begin to address them now.  
And, indeed, this exploration further highlights the urgency of 
finding more effective and legitimate means of galvanizing 
action to increase enforcement and mobilization of compliance 
with the climate change law regime. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AS SECURITY THREAT 
This Part will explore how state contributions to climate 
change will come to be seen as threats to international peace and 
security.  It begins with an examination of how the consequences 
of climate change are already thought to constitute a threat to 
national security, and how the developing crisis is likely to 
accentuate that perspective as the consequences become more 
widespread and severe.  It then briefly reviews the international 
climate change law regime, which defines the standards against 
 
not-invade-the-amazon/ [https://perma.cc/3DCC-8GTQ] (anticipating and responding to 
the ideas in this very article). 
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which state conduct will be judged, but which is so far proving 
to be incapable of mobilizing sufficient compliance to prevent the 
unfolding crisis.  And finally, in the last section, this Part will 
explore the likely shift in perceptions, framed and shaped in part 
by the international climate change law regime, to view the 
causes of climate change, in the form of recklessly excessive and 
flagrantly unlawful contributions to climate change, as 
comprising threats not only to individual state national security, 
but ultimately to international peace and security as well. 
A. The Consequences of Climate Change as National Security 
Threat 
It is assumed here that readers are familiar with the general 
problem of climate change—that is, that emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) resulting from 
human activity are causing a warming of the Earth’s 
atmosphere, which is increasingly impacting the global climate 
and ecological systems.25  As will be explained in more detail 
below, if the process of warming continues there will be an 
increased melting of polar regions causing significant sea level 
rise, increasingly severe weather events, more frequent and 
severe droughts and flooding, all resulting in areas of the world 
being rendered uninhabitable, and species extinctions on a scale 
that will cause a massive impact on global bio-diversity.26  This 
is a problem that was identified decades ago, and there have 
been calls for significant policy response since the early 1970s.27 
While there has been the development of an international legal 
 
25  LE TREUT ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan 
Solomon et al. eds., 2007).  Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007); Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014:  Synthesis Report, Contribution 
of Working Group I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Core Writing Team et al. eds., 2014).  See also INCROPERA, 
supra note 9. 
26 See INCROPERA, supra note 9, at 103; IPCC, AR5 CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY (Christopher B. Fields et al. eds., 2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ [hereinafter IPCC AR5]. 
27 See, e.g., George F. Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 FOREIGN 
AFF., Apr., 1970; Maxwell D. Taylor, The Legitimate Claims of National Security, 52 
FOREIGN AFF. 575, Apr. 1974 
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regime to address the problem (as discussed below), 28  and 
national efforts of varying degrees to limit GHG emissions, the 
world as a whole has continued to increase emissions almost 
annually (with a brief hiatus after the financial crisis of 2008).  
This has added to the total stock of GHGs already in the 
atmosphere and global temperatures have been increasing in 
line with the increase in GHG emissions.29 
The nations of the world have, in principle, committed to 
responding to the crisis so as to limit global temperature rise to 
2°C increase over pre-industrial levels, with a preferred target 
of 1.5°C.30  The most recent report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) states that the observed 
global mean surface temperature for the decade 2006–2015 was 
0.87°C higher than the average over 1850–1900.31  This warming 
is higher in certain regions; for example, it is two to three times 
higher in the Arctic. 32   Moreover, the average global 
temperature is currently increasing at approximately 0.2°C per 
decade due to past and ongoing emissions—and it is important 
to understand that there is “an inexorable level” of temperature 
increase from past emissions that is “locked in,” which would 
continue for decades even if we ceased all GHG emissions 
today. 33   In the period from 2006–2012, the average carbon 
dioxide emissions from just fossil fuel and concrete use (which 
comprises approximately 90% of carbon dioxide emissions) 
amounted to 8.3 gigatons (“GtC”) per year.  In short, GHG 
emissions continue to increase, and warming therefore is 
increasing—and as will be discussed below, too much carbon in 
the atmosphere will trigger adverse positive feedback loops and 
 
28 See infra Part II(B). 
29  See Greenhouse Gas Levels in Atmosphere Reach New Record, WORLD 
METEOROLOGICAL ORG. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-
release/greenhouse-gas-levels-atmosphere-reach-new-record [https://perma.cc/68SX-
NRCA]; Emissions Gap Report, U.N. ENV’T (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/asse 
ts/uploads/2018/12/UNEP-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A923-6P2R]. 
30  Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 at 4 (Dec. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 
21st Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement], 
Annex at 22. 
31 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers in Special 
Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C, 4 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC 1.5 Report]. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 4–5. 
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cascade tipping points characteristic in complex systems, which 
create the potential for exponential rather than linear 
temperature increase, resulting in dramatic climate 
disruption.34  The crisis is getting worse, and the international 
community is failing to respond adequately. 
The worsening crisis will have national security implications.  
While national security is not the typical “frame” within which 
the climate change crisis is generally discussed, the idea that 
climate change poses a threat to the national security of states 
is not new.  Indeed, some of the early warnings about climate 
change, back in the 1980s, were framed in security terms.35  In 
recent years, a number of Western governments have identified 
aspects of climate change as a significant threat to national 
security; in the United States, the Department of Defense and 
the CIA have increasingly focused on climate change as a 
threat.36  These threats take different forms, and are more or 
less direct in the manner in which they are thought to impact 
national security.  The most direct threat is in the form of the 
damage and degradation of military and defense infrastructure 
caused by extreme weather events and rising sea levels.  One 
recent example of this was the severe damage sustained by 
Tyndall Airforce Base in Florida due to Hurricane Michael in 
October 2018.37  The frequency and intensity of such storms, and 
the speed with which they develop, are thought to be increasing 
as a direct consequence of climate change. 38   The U.S. 
Department of Defense in its 2019 Report on Effects of a 
 
34 See infra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text. 
35 See generally, e.g., Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF., 
no. 2, 1989 at 162.  For a discussion of this early debate, see Campbell & Parthemore, 
supra note 2. 
36 See generally, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE 
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2019) [hereinafter DOD CLIMATE CHANGE 2019 
REPORT]; NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY OF 
ANTICIPATED CLIMATE CHANGE (2016); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., GLOBAL STRATEGIC 
TRENDS: THE FUTURE STARTS TODAY (6th ed., 2018). 
37 See Joel Achenbach et al., Hurricane Michael:  Tyndall Air Force Base Was in the Eye 





38 See IPCC AR5, supra note 26, Summary for Policymakers. 
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Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, focused on the 
vulnerabilities of defense installations and infrastructure to 
climate related effects, including drought, desertification, 
wildfires, thawing permafrost, and recurrent flooding.39  The 
report also analyzed the predicted increasing impact of climate 
change on defense operations, particularly in the areas of 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, support for civil 
authorities, and operations abroad in areas such as the Arctic.40  
Of course, for more vulnerable states, the threat to national 
security is even more direct and existential—several island 
nations of the South Pacific are already confronting the threat 
of being rendered uninhabitable by rising sea levels.41 
Many government agencies have identified the indirect 
threats created by climate change as being even more extreme 
than the direct threats.  In this sense, climate change is often 
referred to as a “threat multiplier.”42  In short, climate change is 
likely to significantly increase the incidence of political unrest 
and socio-economic disruption which, in turn, is likely to lead to 
increased levels of armed conflict over the coming decades.43  
Such effects will be caused by a confluence of consequences of 
climate change.  These will include the rendering of some 
territories and regions effectively uninhabitable due to flooding, 
drought, sea level rise, or even excessively hot temperature 
itself—parts of India, for instance, have already recorded 
sustained temperatures in excess of 50 degrees Celsius. 44  
Droughts, famines, and epidemics resulting from disrupted 
 
39 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE 2019 REPORT, supra note 36, at 4–7. 
40 Id. at 8–9; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE-
RELATED RISKS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 2–5 (2015) [hereinafter DOD CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2015 REPORT]. 
41 Josh Gabbatiss, Rising Sea Levels Could Make Thousands of Islands from the Maldives 




42 See, e.g., THE CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 44 (2007) [hereinafter CNA Report]; DOD CLIMATE CHANGE 2015 
REPORT, supra note 40, at 8. 
43 CNA Report, supra note 42, at 7, 25, 30. 
44 See Shekhar Chandra, Are Parts of India Becoming Too Hot for Humans?, CNN (July 
3, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/03/asia/india-heat-wave-survival-hnk-intl/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/S8RR-7NAY]. 
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agricultural and drinking water supplies will exacerbate 
problems in vulnerable socio-political and economically 
challenged regions.45  All of this is not only going to lead directly 
to increased tension and armed conflict both within and among 
states, but it is going to result in massive movements of people, 
creating migration and internal displacement crises that dwarf 
the recent refugee problems we are already experiencing. 46  
There is considerable evidence that climate change was a 
contributing factor in the conflicts in Darfur and Syria, for 
instance, 47  and that it has been a factor in explaining the 
increased migration flows out of Central America, the Middle 
East, and North Africa in the last ten years.48  As the Center for 
Naval Analysis (“CAN”) Corporation stated in a landmark report 
in 2007, “the chaos that results can be an incubator of civil strife, 
genocide, and the growth of terrorism,” leading to state failure, 
interstate conflict, and a host of other related security problems 
for the U.S. defense establishment.49 
The extent of such disruption and conflict will depend 
ultimately on the extent of temperature rise, which will in turn 
depend both on global GHG emissions as well as the nature of 
somewhat unpredictable tipping points, which may trigger a 
series of positive feedback loops as temperatures rise.50  Such 
feedback loops include, for instance, the temperature rise caused 
 
45 See Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 2, at 10. 
46 See Leon Fuerth, Security Implications of Climate Scenario 2:  Severe Climate Change 
of the Next Thirty Years, in CLIMATIC CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 133–54. 
47 See, e.g., Matt McDonald, Climate Change and Security:  Towards Ecological Security?, 
10 INT’L THEORY 153, 154 (2018); but see Katharine J. Mach et al., Climate as a Risk 
Factor for Armed Conflict, 571 NATURE 193, (2019) (discussing complexity of relationship 
among multiple variables). 
48 See generally, e.g., DOD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2015, supra note 40, at 4; Rafael 
Reuveny, Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict, 26 POL. GEOGRAPHY 
656 (2007). 
49 CNA REPORT, supra note 42, at 22. 
50 See Nina Lakhani, ‘People are Dying’:  How the Climate Crisis Has Sparked an Exodus 
to the US, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
2019/jul/29/guatemala-climate-crisis-migration-drought-famine 
[https://perma.cc/C7ND-2TCA]; Jeff Turrentine, Climate Change is Already Driving 
Mass Migration Around the Globe, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL:  ON EARTH (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/climate-change-already-driving-mass-migration-around-
globe [https://perma.cc/7SJU-6WQF]; see also OLI BROWN, INT’L ORG. FOR  MIGRATION, 
MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 31 (2018). 
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by decreased reflection of sunlight from the artic region as the 
size of the polar ice cap shrinks, and the release of large volumes 
of methane as the tundra in the Arctic region melts.51  That 
latter scenario may already be upon us, much sooner than 
expected. 52   Another such tipping point is implicated by the 
current deforestation of the Amazonian rain forest.  Forests in 
general, and tropical rainforests such as the Amazon in 
particular, are understood to play a significant role in both 
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it, and 
thus the loss of rainforest, and the release of its stored carbon 
dioxide if burned, will significantly contribute to increases in 
GHGs in the atmosphere.53  The Amazonian rainforest, which 
comprises 40 percent of the world’s rainforest, recycles much of 
its own water—which means that if it is reduced in size beyond 
a certain amount, it will produce too little water to sustain the 
remaining forest, and there will be a vicious cycle of degradation 
or “dieback.”  More pessimistic analyses estimate that this 
catastrophic cascade could be initiated when another 3–8 
percent of the forest is destroyed.54  As headlines have blared in 
the summer of 2019, the rate of Brazilian destruction of the 
rainforest has seen a massive increase in 2019, with almost 
1,500 square kilometers destroyed in July 2019 alone, a rate of 
three football fields a minute.55 
Turning back to the question of how much disruption and 
conflict is likely to be caused by climate change, one important 
study published in 2008 looked at the likely national security 
 
51 See Timothy Lenton, Arctic Climate Tipping Points, 41 AMBIO 10 (2012); see also Casey 
Ivanovich, Everything You Need to Know About Climate Tipping Points, ENVT’L DEF.  
FUND CLIMATE 411 (Nov. 1, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2017/11/01/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-climate-tipping-points/ [https://perma.cc/4RQL-3HGB]. 
52 Merritt R. Turetsky et al., Permafrost Collapse is Accelerating Carbon Release, 159 
NATURE 32 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01313-4 [https://perma. 
cc/L2YQ-YR33]. 
53  For an overview, see generally ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CARBON 
SEQUESTRATION IN FORESTS (2009). 
54  Nova Xavantina & Santarém, On the Brink:  The Amazon is Approaching an 
Irreversible Tipping Point, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.economist.com/ 
briefing/2019/08/01/the-amazon-is-approaching-an-irreversible-tipping-point 
[https://perma.cc/PF4F-XVC7]. 
55 Jonathan Watts, Amazon Deforestation Accelerating Towards Unrecoverable ‘Tipping 
Point,’ GUARDIAN (July 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/ 
amazonian-rainforest-near-unrecoverable-tipping-point [https://perma.cc/FQ4Y-F9BL]. 
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implications of climate change under a number of different 
scenarios.56  Two of these scenarios were developed with thirty-
year time horizons, predicting developments in 2040, while the 
third examined a much longer period, providing predictions for 
conditions at the end of the century.  The first of these, the so-
called “expected” and most optimistic scenario, assumed an 
average global temperature increase of 1.3°C by 2040.  Even 
under this optimistic scenario, the anticipated consequences 
included:  heighted tensions and conflicts caused by large-scale 
migrations; increased levels of armed conflict caused by food and 
water scarcity, particularly in Africa; increased incidence of 
disease and pandemics; socio-political backlash to migration in 
Europe that could test the cohesion of the EU; and some 
“geopolitical reordering” as states adjust to the new normal.57 
The study is already ten years old, and the assumptions upon 
which this “expected” scenario was based now look impossibly 
optimistic.  There is almost no way that we will keep the global 
average temperature rise to 1.3°C by 2040.  The IPCC, in a 
special report issued in 2018, concluded with a high degree of 
confidence that global average temperature will at a very 
minimum reach 1.5°C by 2040—and that is only if emissions 
remain at current rates, and there are not any accelerations in 
warming caused by the kinds of positive feedback loops 
discussed above.58  As we have seen, rates of GHG emissions 
actually continue to increase, and some of those tipping points, 
such as the release of Arctic methane, now look far more 
imminent than thought just a few years ago.59 
The next scenario in the study, referred to as the “severe” 
scenario, looks far more possible now than when it was written.  
 
56 Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 2. 
57 John Podesta & Peter Ogden, Security Implications of Climate Scenario 1: Expected 
Climate Change over the Next Thirty Years, in CLIMATE CATACLYSM:  THE FOREIGN 
POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at loc. 
1294 (Kindle ed.). 
58 IPCC, 1.5 REPORT, supra note 31 (global warming is predicted with a high degree of 
confidence as likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2050 if it continues to increase at 
the current rate).  The IPCC also has developed a number of different scenarios for 
temperature rise, based on different annual emissions rates, over the rest of the Century.  
For all IPCC data and publications, see THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch [https://perma.cc/MA3M-9SMM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
59 See Turetsky et al., supra note 52. 
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It was based on the assumption that global average 
temperatures would rise by 2.6°C by 2040, due to the possibility 
of cascades and positive feedback loops being triggered.  The 
basis for building such possible feedback loops and cascading 
consequences into the model is that climate change is a complex 
phenomenon in the technical sense of that term—meaning that 
it is a system that changes in non-linear and unstable ways.  
Incremental changes in the level of inputs to a complex system 
can result in much larger changes to outputs, and it is not 
possible to create a single model of the system’s behavior. 60  
Given that we already understand what some likely feedback 
loops are,61 and that there are likely other less well-understood 
and unanticipated knock-on effects to other likely changes, this 
scenario has reasonably built-in some non-linear temperature 
increase. 
Under this scenario, these significant non-linear cascading 
events in the global environment result in massive non-linear 
socio-political consequences.  Many states will be overwhelmed 
by the scale of change and resulting challenges.  The internal 
cohesion of states, including even the less vulnerable Western 
states, will be severely tested by massive migration flows, 
changes in agricultural patterns and water availability, 
economic disruption, the possible crash of global fish stocks, and 
by pandemics.62  Multilateral institutions, including the U.N. 
itself, may fail.  Health care systems and social assistance 
networks in more vulnerable states will collapse.  Climate 
change will likely “be the deathblow for democratic government 
throughout Latin America.” 63   Coastal flooding under these 
temperatures will pose particular challenges, with massive 
population dislocation and economic disruption when coastal 
cities become unsustainable, and the agricultural lands of 
historic river delta regions are lost.  A significant increase in the 
incidence and breadth of armed conflict is thus forecast.64  In 
 
60 Fuerth, supra note 46, at 135–36.  For a review of complexity theory, see generally 
NEIL F. JOHNSON, SIMPLY COMPLEXITY:  A CLEAR GUIDE TO COMPLEXITY THEORY (2007). 
61 See, e.g., INCORPERA, supra note 9, at 74–79; see also supra notes 51–52. 
62 Fuerth, supra note 46 at loc. 1765 (Kindle ed.). 
63 Id. at 138. 
64 Id. 
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this scenario, “climate change provokes a permanent shift in the 
relationship of humankind to nature.”65 
These two scenarios only take us out to 2040, twenty years 
from now and thirty years from when they were written, and yet 
one of them already sounds like something approaching the 
scenes in a dystopian sci-fi movie.  But it gets much worse as we 
move the time horizon out further.  The third scenario in the 
study assumed a global average temperature rise of 5.6°C by 
2095.66  This is not at all unlikely given current trends and the 
possibility of complex system dynamics, though the study 
emphasizes that it is very difficult to predict both temperatures 
and consequences that far out. 67   Notwithstanding all such 
caveats, the study predicts that the consequences of such a 
temperature rise will be catastrophic68—“hundreds of millions of 
thirsty and starving people will have to flee” the myriad 
disasters, and “the world will be caught in an age where sheer 
survival is the only goal.”69  In this kind of scenario we really are 
in the midst of dystopian sci-fi horror.  And yet, difficult as it is 
to get our heads around this scenario, it is very much in the 
realm of the very possible, if not quite yet probable.  And the 
window of opportunity for action to prevent it is quite rapidly 
closing. 
While these three scenarios are just the conclusions of one 
particular study, they are very much in line with the concerns 
expressed in the reports of various government agencies and 
international institutions, both in terms of the projected 
temperature rise and the likely consequences.70  Most studies 
suggest that if we are unable to very soon bring emissions down 
in accordance with the targets established in the international 
climate change law regime, then the future in 2100 will be one 
of massive disruption and conflict, even if it may not quite reach 
 
65 Id. at 153. 
66  See Sharon E. Burke, Security Implications of Climate Scenario 3:  Catastrophic 
Climate Change over the Next Hundred Years, in CLIMATE CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN 
POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 
158. 
67 Id. at 156–58. 
68 Id. at 158. 
69 Campbell & Parthemore, supra note 2, at 19. 
70 See generally, e.g., IPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 31; IPCC AR5, supra note 26. 
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the dystopian nightmare contemplated in the third scenario 
above.71  As this reality unfolds, not only will the consequences 
of climate change be increasingly identified as national security 
threats, but so too will some of the causes of climate change.  As 
we progress toward this dystopian future, it is quite predictable 
that states perceived as recklessly contributing to the cause of 
the crisis through excessive GHG emissions, or by destroying 
forests and other carbon dioxide sinks, likely in flagrant 
violation of their international climate change law obligations, 
are going to be increasingly viewed as a threat to the national 
security of other countries.  Indeed, they will be viewed as a 
threat to international peace and security, and there will be 
demands for collective action against them, with legal 
justifications grounded in legal regimes beyond the 
international law governing climate change itself.  While 
international climate change law may provide the basis for 
determining that a state is recklessly and flagrantly in violation 
of the norms grounding international efforts to address the crisis, 
the severity of the crisis is in part due to the legal regime’s 
failure to sufficiently mobilize compliance with its terms.  It is 
to that regime we turn next. 
B. The International Climate Change Law Regime 
In this section, I briefly examine the operation of the climate 
change regime to provide a basis for explaining how perceived 
violations of the international legal obligations created by this 
regime could be relied upon for determining that a state is 
recklessly contributing to climate change, and thereby help 
frame perceptions of security threats. 
1. The Treaty Regime 
The origins of the international response to climate change is 
usually traced back to the Stockholm Declaration, made at the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
 
71 Id.; see also Matt McGrath, Climate Change:  12 Years to Save the Planet?  Make that 
18 Months, BBC NEWS (July 24, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-
48964736 [https://perma.cc/R4FZ-Q8FJ]. 
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1972.72  But the treaty foundation for the international climate 
change law regime is provided by the United Nations 
Framework for Climate Change Convention (“UNFCCC”), 
adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992.73  It defined the 
ultimate objective of the Convention as the stabilization of GHG 
concentrations at a level that would not cause dangerous 
interference with the climate system,74 established an obligation 
to work in cooperation towards that objective in accordance with 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and 
provided the basis for establishing individual national GHG 
emissions commitments.75  It also established an institutional 
framework for continuing negotiation and decision-making, 
most significantly in the annual Conference of the Parties (COP), 
which among other things decides on the development and 
implementation of any amendments and protocols to the 
Convention.76  The Kyoto Protocol,  adopted in 1997, imposed 
concrete commitments of result on a relatively small group of the 
most developed countries in the form of specific target reductions 
in GHG emissions, defined as a percentage of their national 
emission levels in 1990. 77  This was the first approach to the 
climate change crisis, in which firm negotiated limits were 
agreed to and imbedded in treaty form.  But the U.S. never 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, largely because developing countries 
were not required to make commitments; then Canada withdrew 
from it on the eve of violating its treaty commitments in 2012.78  
What is more, the next round of negotiations on extending the 
 
72 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–
16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 2 and Corr. 1 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
73  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force, Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
74 Id. at art. 2. 
75 Id. at arts. 3, 4, and 7. 
76 Id. art. 7; see BENOIT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE 33–38 
(2018); DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 118–59 (2017). 
77 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 3 [Hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
78 MAYER, supra note 76, at 41; Ian Austen, Canada Announces Exit from Kyoto Climate 
Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/ 
science/earth/canada-leaving-kyoto-protocol-on-climate-change.html 
[https://perma.cc/AS2X-DESD]. 
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Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Agreement,79 has still not been ratified.  
These failures led to a search for different approaches. 
A more recent alternative approach, beginning with the Bali 
Action Plan in 2007,80 is for treaties to require state parties to 
commit to setting for themselves ambitious but unspecified 
emission targets, thus leaving it to the discretion of countries to 
subsequently determine their own specific emission targets.  
What is more, this extended the obligation to all states, 
developing and developed alike, rather than limiting the 
commitments to the most developed countries. 81   This 
alternative approach also identified a new objective of limiting 
warming as a result of climate change to an average of 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels, which was articulated in the Copenhagen 
Accord, and confirmed in the following Cancun Agreement of 
COP 16. 82   This approach culminated in the Paris Climate 
Change Agreement in 2016,83 which provided that each party to 
the treaty was required to submit ambitious emission reduction 
targets or “nationally determined contributions” (“NDCs”), with 
the expectation that these would be increased over time in order 
to meet the objective of absolutely limiting warming to 2°C, and 
preferably to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.84  The 
Paris Agreement also creates mechanisms for monitoring, 
implementing, and mobilizing compliance with the 
commitments made.85 
 
79 Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 9 (the Doha 
Amendment), in the Annex of Decision 1/CMP.8, U.N. Doc. FCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/ 
Add.1 (Dec. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Doha Amendment]. 
80 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision I/CP.13: Bali Action Plan 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 
(Mar. 14, 2008). 
81 MAYER, supra note 76, at 43–44. 
82 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 30; Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, 16th Sess., 
Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
83 Paris Agreement, supra note 30. 
84 Id. art. 2.1. 
85 For review of the operation of the Paris Agreement, see, e.g., MAYER, supra note 76, at 
45-49; BODANSKY, supra note 76, 209–50.  For the manner in which it creates legally 
binding obligations, see Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Climate Commons Law:  The 
Transformative Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 893, 952–
53 (2018). 
MARTIN-MACRO-041820 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/20  12:26 AM 
2020] Atmospheric Intervention 353 
 
Much has been made of the voluntary nature of the NDCs, 
leading many engaged in the public discourse on the agreement 
to remark that it is not “legally binding.”86   The treaty was 
structured in this way, avoiding explicit binding substantive 
obligations of result, for a few reasons—not least of which to 
assist President Obama in characterizing the treaty as an 
“executive agreement” for purposes of the American domestic 
law and political process.87  But there should be no mistake that 
it is a treaty as understood under international law, and that 
aspects of the treaty are legally binding.  Indeed, there is an 
argument to be made that the NDCs themselves also become 
binding commitments. 88   First, Article 4 creates a clear 
commitment to make NDCs that constitute an ambitious and 
rapid reduction of each party’s contribution to climate change by 
achieving a balance between reductions in their GHG emissions 
and an increase in their removal of GHGs via sinks and other 
methods.89  Each state is required to prepare and communicate 
its NDC for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the 
agreement, and is required to increase its NDC every five years 
in a manner that reflects “its highest possible ambition.”90  Once 
submitted, and subsequently relied upon by other countries in 
determining their own NDCs and other aspects of climate 
change policy, these submissions can be viewed as unilateral 
declarations that are substantively binding.91  Thus, by way of 
 
86 Samantha Page, No, The Paris Climate Agreement Isn’t Binding.  Here’s Why that 
Doesn’t Matter, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/no-the-paris-
climate-agreement-isnt-binding-here-s-why-that-doesn-t-matter-62827c72bb04/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZAM7-ESAV]; Tess Bridgeman, Paris Is a Binding Agreement: Here is 
Why that Matters, JUST SECURITY (June 4, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41705/ 
paris-binding-agreement-matters/ [https://perma.cc/K3P9-YFRC]; MAYER, supra note 76, 
at 45. 
87 Page, supra note 86.  It should be noted that notwithstanding considerable confusion 
on this point within some of the American commentary on the subject, while the Paris 
Agreement is not a “treaty” as that term is understood within the U.S. constitutional 
system, it is without doubt a treaty under international law.  See, e.g., MAYER, supra 
note 76, at 45. 
88 Sourgens, supra note 85, at 937–44. 
89 Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.1, 4.2. 
90 Id. art. 4.3.  For a list of the NDCs of the 184 states that have submitted their first 
NDCs, see UNFCC NDC REGISTRY, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/ 
All.aspx [https://perma.cc/YQK3-RSVK] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
91 Sourgens, supra note 85, at 893. 
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example, Canada submitted its NDC, identifying a target of 
reducing its GHG emissions by 30 percent below 2005 levels by 
2030.92  The United States submitted its first NDC (prior to the 
Trump administration announcing its intention to withdraw), 
committing to reduce GHG emissions by 26–28 percent below 
2005 levels by 2025.  Brazil committed to a reduction of 37 
percent of 2005 levels by 2025.93  After all parties submitted 
their first NDCs, an IPCC analysis indicated that the aggregate 
effect of the reductions committed to, assuming that all were 
fully realized, would still fall considerably short of limiting an 
increase of global average temperature to 2°C, and could 
actually lead to as much as a 3°C increase by 2100.94 
Failing to meet their NDCs or refusing to increase the levels 
of their NDCs when required every five or ten years would 
constitute a violation of the conduct obligations under the treaty.  
Or, for that matter, if the original NDCs were not made in good 
faith as reflecting the state’s highest ambition “in accordance 
with the best available science,” that too would clearly be a 
violation of the state’s commitments under the agreement. 95  
Even if one were to concede that the Paris Agreement does not 
create binding obligations of result, there is no question that it, 
and the entire United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) framework, have together 
established an increasingly granular set of obligations of conduct.  
Moreover, the Paris Agreement provided that more detailed 
rules would be implemented after it came into force by decisions 
of the COP, 96  and the complete “Paris Rulebook” was 
promulgated by the parties to the treaty at the end of 2018.97  
 
92 For a record of the NDCs of the 184 states that have submitted their first NDCs, see 
UNFCC NDC REGISTRY, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx [htt 
ps://perma.cc/YQK3-RSVK]. 
93 Id. 
94  UNFCCC Secretariat, Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions:  An Update, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2016/2 (May 2, 2016). 
95 Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.  On good faith in compliance with treaty 
obligations, see generally, e.g., Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, 2 UCL 
J. L. & JURIS. 40 (2013). 
96 Paris Agreement, supra note 30, art. 13.3; see also MAYER, supra note 76 at 45, 49. 
97 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 2–14, 2018, Matters relating to the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, para. 5.  The Paris Rulebook was issued at COP 
24 in Katowice Poland:  The Katowice Texts: Proposal by the President, Dec. 15, 2018, 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/katowice-climate-change-
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These rules are clearly binding on the parties.  And, as 
mentioned above, in addition to this growing complex of 
obligations of conduct, there are arguments that the Paris 
Agreement creates a framework of interlocking unilateral 
declarations with strong reliance interests, which together 
operate to make the NDCs legally binding obligations of result 
under international law.98  Moreover, we may predict that over 
the next decade the web of obligations, both in terms of 
commitments to cooperate generally in the achievement of 
treaty objectives, and in terms of national commitments to limit 
GHG emissions, will become ever more robust and constraining. 
What is more important here is that under both the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Agreement approaches, the obligations of 
states are framed as commitments to a reduction in GHG 
emissions expressed as a percentage of an earlier national level 
of emissions.  Thus, the thirty-eight developed states listed in 
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol were obligated to reduce their 
GHG emissions during the period between 2005–2012 by at least 
5 percent below total national emissions in 1990.99  The Paris 
Agreement requires each state to submit NDCs committing 
them to reduce GHG emissions, and many states have again 
expressed these as a percentage of their national emission totals 
in 2005.100  Thus, when we turn below to the question of how one 
might assess or determine what constitutes “recklessly excessive” 
contributions to climate change, this is the frame of reference to 
which we should look—total current national GHG emissions 
expressed as percentages measured against specified past 
benchmarks. 
There is no doubt that this approach overlooks many complex 
questions sounding in ethics and equity on assessing the 
responsibility for climate change.  This approach, for instance, 
does not take into consideration the historical contributions to 
the total stock of GHGs currently in the atmosphere, and 
developing countries have long argued that “differentiation” 
 
conference-december-2018/katowice-climate-change-conference-december-2018.  See 
generally Lavanya Rajamani & Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Rulebook:  Balancing 
International Prescriptivenss with National Discretion, 68 ICLQ 1023 (2019). 
98 Sourgens, supra note 85, at 937–44. 
99 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77, art. 3.1, Annex B. 
100 Paris Agreement, supra note 30, arts. 3, 4; see also MAYER, supra note 76, at 47–48. 
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should be understood as recognizing that Western countries 
have a greater responsibility for having contributed the lion’s 
share of GHGs to date. 101   Similarly, one might think that 
emissions should be looked at on a per-capita basis rather than 
on a per-state basis, or in absolute terms rather than in terms of 
percentage reduction.102  Be that as it may, the approach that 
has been adopted by the legal regime is as described, and this 
will almost certainly be the frame of reference for considering 
when a state is recklessly offside its legal obligations under that 
regime. 
2. Custom and General Principles 
In addition to this treaty-based regime there are a number of 
principles of customary international law and general principles 
of international law that are relevant to the limitation of state 
contributions to climate change.  The treaty-based regime is not 
understood to constitute a lex specialis that displaces or 
interferes with the operation of these principles.103  Most central 
to our analysis is the “no-harm” principle.  One of the original 
sources of this principle is a case involving environmental law, 
the Trail Smelter case of 1941, in which an arbitration panel 
found that no state has the right to use, or permit its territory to 
be used, in such a manner as to cause environmental harm 
within the territory of another state.104  The principle is not 
limited to direct transboundary harm, or to environmental law, 
as it has developed into a more general principle that obligates 
 
101  See generally MARCIA ROCHA ET AL., CLIMATE ANALYTICS, HISTORICAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE—FROM COUNTRIES EMISSIONS TO CONTRIBUTION 
TO TEMPERATURE INCREASE (2015); CAIT Historical Emissions Data, World Res. Inst. 
(June 2015), https://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/cait-historical-emissions-data-
countries-us-states-unfccc [https://perma.cc/PPH6-FGEY]; T.A. BODEN ET AL., GLOBAL, 
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL FOSSIL-FUEL CO2 EMISSIONS (1751-2014) (V. 2017), Carbon 
Dioxide Analysis Center, U.S. Dept. of Energy, https://www.osti.gov/dataexplorer/biblio/ 
dataset/1389331 [https://perma.cc/8BL5-8NXB] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
102 See, e.g., INCROPERA, supra note 9, at 234–40. 
103  MAYER, supra note 76, at 66; see also Douglas Kysar, Climate Change and the 
International Court of Justice (Yale Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 315, 38, 
2013); Christina Voigt, State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 1, 4 (2008); RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 143 (2005). 
104 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 
1905 (1941).  
MARTIN-MACRO-041820 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/20  12:26 AM 
2020] Atmospheric Intervention 357 
 
states to prevent their territory from being used in any way that 
may cause harm to other states. This was articulated by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Corfu Channel 
case,105 and again reiterated in the context of the use of force in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States).106  Indeed, the no-harm principle 
has been articulated as one of the central premises of the 
“unwilling or unable” doctrine, which has been relied upon by 
some states to justify the use of force against NSAs in non-
consenting states—a topic that will be examined more closely in 
our discussion of the jus ad bellum regime below.107   In the 
environmental context, the principle has been affirmed in the 
Stockholm Declaration,108 in the Rio Declaration,109 and in the 
preamble to the UNFCCC. 110   The ICJ has affirmed it as 
customary international law as it applies to the environment, 
holding in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons that “[t]he existence of the general 
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment.”111 
There is considerable debate regarding the scope, content, and 
operation of the no-harm principle, and we need not get too deep 
into the details of that debate here. 112   But the principle is 
 
105 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9). 
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 54 (Jun. 27). 
107 See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. 
108 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 72. 
109 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992) 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration], Principle 2. 
110 UNFCC, supra note 73, preamble. 
111 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(July 8), ¶ 29. 
112 See, e.g., Marte Jervan, The Prohibition of Transboundary Environmental Harm: An 
Analysis of the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of 
the No-Harm RulePluriCourts, Research Paper No. 14-17 (2014), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486421; An Hertogen, Due Diligence: An Effective 
Response to Transboundary Environmental Harm? (forthcoming 2020) (on file with 
author); MAYER, supra note 76, at 67–71; Alexander Zahar, Mediated Versus Cumulative 
Environmental Damage and the International Law Association’s Principles on Climate 
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understood to impose both substantive and procedural duties.  
The substantive obligation, in turn, can be interpreted as having 
one of two distinct aspects, namely a negative “no-harm” 
obligation—that is, an obligation of result that requires states to 
refrain from conduct that will cause harm to other states; and a 
positive “prevention of harm” obligation—that is, an obligation 
of conduct that requires states to engage in due diligence to 
ensure that activity within the state’s territory or under its 
jurisdiction is not likely to cause harm beyond its borders.113  
The latter appears to be the dominant or most widely accepted 
approach as reflected in the recent jurisprudence of the ICJ, the 
International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on 
Prevention, and the academic literature.114  Under this approach, 
the no-harm principle obliges states to take affirmative action to 
prevent “significant harm,” and to reduce the risk of significant 
harm beyond their borders, not only directly to and within the 
territory of other states, but also to and within regions that 
comprise the global commons.115  This obligation thus includes a 
substantive duty to engage in due diligence and preventative 
activity ex ante, and failure to take such action once a state is on 
notice of the risk of harm will itself constitute a violation of the 
obligation.116  The standard for assessing the adequacy of due 
diligence will depend on the nature of the specific risks at 
 
Change, 4 CLIMATE L. 217 (2014); PATRICE BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 137–52 (3d ed. 2009). 
113 MAYER, supra note 76, at 67; PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 200 (3d ed. 2012); BIRNIE, supra note 112, 137–
42; Jervan, supra note 112, at 98–100. 
114 Jervan, supra note 112, at 62–64; MAYER, supra note 76, at 67–71; Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. Reports 14, ¶ 101 (Apr. 20).  See also 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, adopted by the Commission at its 53rd Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 
[hereinafter ILC Articles on Prevention].  For more on the shift to obligations of conduct, 
see generally Jutta Brunnée, ESIL Reflection, Procedure and Substance in International 
Environmental Law:  Confused at a Higher Level? 5 EUR. SOC. INT’L L., no. 6, 1 (2016); 
Benoit Mayer, Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change:  A 
Defence, 27 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 130 (2018). 
115 See Jervan, supra note 112, at 53 (noting that “significant” harm, not “serious” or 
“substantial,” is the established threshold for triggering the obligation); see also ILC 
Articles on Prevention, supra note 114, at 152, ¶ 4; Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ 226, ¶ 29 (July 8); Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary 
v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 53 (Sept. 25). 
116 Jervan, supra note 112, at 62. 
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issue—the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention simply require that 
states take “all appropriate measures to prevent significant 
transboundary harm”—a formulation that was followed by the 
ICJ in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case.117  Finally, the 
procedural duties require states to notify, warn, inform, and 
consult with other states regarding any risk of harm arising 
from the state’s activity, which includes an obligation to conduct 
environmental impact assessments prior to engaging in the 
conduct in question.118 
It may seem, and indeed several scholars have argued, that 
the transboundary no-harm principle can have no application in 
the context of climate change.119  This is because all states are 
emitting GHGs, contributing to climate change, and thereby 
doing some harm to not only all other states but also to 
themselves.  Clearly the no-harm principle cannot be implicated 
by all GHG emissions (or, to put it another way, not all GHG 
emissions can constitute transboundary harm), even though all 
such GHG emissions are in fact contributing to the overall harm 
caused by climate change.  Unlike in typical environmental 
transboundary harm cases, such as the Trail Smelter case, the 
actions of the impugned state are not the direct and proximate 
cause of any specific localized harm in a neighboring state.120  
Rather, the impugned conduct is merely causing an incremental 
contribution to a global phenomenon that will result in a diffuse 
harm, manifesting itself in different ways all around the world.  
And, as Alexander Zahar has argued, even considering the GHG 
emissions of the United States in a given year, that discrete 
annual contribution of a single nation is negligible—it is only the 
accumulation of such annual emissions over many years, in 
combination with all other emissions in the world, that results 
in the mounting harm, which is global in its effects.121  Yet the 
 
117 ILC Articles on Prevention, supra note 114, at 154 ¶ 11; see Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay, supra note 114, ¶¶ 201–06; and see Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua 
in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶¶ 101-05, 153 (Dec. 16).  
See generally Jervan, supra note 112, at 64–65. 
118 Brunnée, supra note 114. 
119 See, e.g., Alexander Zahar, The Contested Core of Climate Law, 8 CLIMATE L. 244 
(2018). 
120 Id. at 249–50. 
121 Id. at 250. 
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dominant view is that precisely because the substantive 
obligations of the no-harm principle are preventative in nature 
and are obligations of conduct, not of result, the principle and its 
obligations can indeed apply to the GHG emissions of states in 
the context of climate change risks.122  One need not prove that 
a given state’s GHG emissions have caused, or will cause, 
specific harm to any other given state, but rather that the state 
was on notice that excessive GHG would be harmful, and that it 
failed in its duties to take all feasible measures to prevent that 
harm, or to engage in due diligence to determine alternatives to 
the harmful conduct.123 
There are a number of other principles that operate as part of 
the overall climate change law framework, and which interact 
with the no-harm principle.  Perhaps most important of these is 
the principle of cooperation, which parties to the UNFCCC 
agreed to in the Rio Declaration, the Stockholm Declaration, and 
in the Preamble to the UNFCCC itself, and which is now 
arguably a principle of customary international law.124  This 
principle creates an obligation for states to cooperate in, among 
other things, achieving the specific objectives of the UNFCCC.125  
In conjunction with this is the principle of sustainable 
development, which is provided for in a number of UNFCCC 
instruments, most notably and recently the Paris Climate 
Agreement.126  The ICJ, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymoros (Hungary 
v. Slovakia) case defined the principle of sustainable 
development as an obligation to reconcile economic development 
 
122 Brunnée, supra note 114, at 6 (focusing more on the procedural aspect than the due-
diligence aspects of the duties).  See also Voigt, supra note 103, at 15; Richard S.J. Tol & 
Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages—
A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1112 (2004) (discussing the 
distinction between general and specific causation in operation of the no-harm principle). 
123 See Brunnée, supra note 114. 
124 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 72, princ. 24; Rio Declaration, supra note 109, 
princ. 14; MAYER, supra note 76, at 75. 
125 MAYER, supra note 76, at 75 (citing in part The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. U.K.), 
Case No. 10, Order for Provisional Measures, Dec. 3, 2001, ITLOS Rep. 95, 110, ¶ 82; 
and Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor 
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Case No. 12, Order for Provisional Measures, Oct. 8, 2003, 
ITLOS Rep. 10).  See also PEEL & SANDS, supra note 113, at 197–98, 205–07. 
126 See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 113, at 217–20. 
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with protection of the environment. 127   Finally, there is the 
precautionary principle, which is a fundamental principle of 
climate change law, articulated in most of the important 
instruments.  The Rio Declaration defines the principle as 
requiring that “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.” 128   The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) has held that the 
precautionary principle is integral to the obligations of due 
diligence in the no-harm principle, in that states are to err on 
the side of precaution in decision-making and policy formulation 
in the event of uncertainty.129  Thus, these principles operate 
together to create a web of obligations, requiring states to 
cooperate in meeting defined climate change mitigation 
objectives, to ensure that their policies are in line with 
sustainable development principles, to err on the side of caution 
in the event of uncertainty as to the magnitude of risk, and to 
affirmatively take action to prevent conduct within their 
territory that runs the risk of causing harm to other states. 
The foregoing provides a very brief overview of the legal 
regime as it applies to limiting GHG emissions and other 
contributions to climate change.  While it provides an 
increasingly robust web of substantive duties and obligations, 
both of conduct and of result, what it lacks is much in the way of 
enforcement mechanisms.  This is, of course, true of most 
international law and much has been written on how 
international law nonetheless manages to mobilize compliance, 
such that “most states obey most of international law most of the 
time,” as Louis Henkin famously observed.130  But it is not clear 
 
127 Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 
¶ 140 (Sept. 25). 
128 Rio Declaration, supra note 109, princ. 15.  See also MAYER, supra note 76, at 73; 
SANDS & PEEL, supra note 113, at 229–39. 
129  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (Seabed Chamber), 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect 
to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion), ITLOS Case No. 17, Feb. 1, 2011, ¶ at para. 
131; see also Brunée, supra note 114, at 5; Jervan, supra note 112, at 72. 
130 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); Harold H. Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599–2604 (1997) (providing an 
overview of the different theoretical explanations). 
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that international climate change law is mobilizing compliance 
to the extent that will be necessary for the international 
community to successfully respond to the mounting crisis.  The 
collective action and coordinating problems are profound, with 
powerful incentives on states to defect from the regime in the 
short term.  One need only look to the example of Canada, a 
nation that typically prides itself for being a champion of both 
the international rule of law and environmental stewardship,131 
yet which withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol when it was on the 
verge of violating its obligations under the treaty.132  There has 
also been a popular backlash to the socio-economic dislocation 
caused by policies designed to meet climate change law 
obligations, which is creating unique stresses for political 
systems to deal with—as illustrated by the manner in which the 
gilet jaune protests hobbled President Macron’s government in 
France in 2019.133  Moreover, this political problem is in turn 
being opportunistically exploited by populist and nationalist 
forces, which are actually campaigning on anti-climate change 
platforms, not only putting democracy itself under strain but 
making collective action to respond to the crisis that much more 
difficult.134 
Adjudication and judicial enforcement is of course one method 
of mobilizing compliance, but it is quite unclear how litigation is 
likely to advance compliance with climate change law 
obligations.  The ICJ has yet to hear a case involving these 
obligations.  The most recent cases in which the ICJ adjudicated 
environmental transboundary harm issues, it emphasized the 
 




132 See supra, note 78. 
133  Zerofsky, supra note 5; see also Tony Barber, Emmanuel Macron’s European 
Ambitions are Hobbled by Troubles at Home, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/ea998530-fe32-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e 
[https://perma.cc/JGT9-6ZM3]. 
134 See, e.g., Damien Cave, It was Supposed to be Australia’s Climate Change Election.  
What Happened?, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/ 
world/australia/election-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/97MW-622C]; Gerald 
Traufetter, AfD Hopes to Win Votes by Opposing Climate Protection, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
INT’L (May 6, 2019), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-seeks-votes-by-
opposing-climate-protection-a-1265494.html. 
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obligations of conduct and due diligence over obligations of 
result, but it did so in a manner that left some uncertainty as to 
how it might address a case in which harm was as diffuse as it 
is in the context of climate change.135  There have been some 
efforts to link excessive contributions to violations of human 
rights, in cases brought to human rights tribunals.136  There is a 
growing body of domestic court cases involving climate change 
claims, with some notable successes.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands upheld a lower court decision that the 
Dutch government’s NDC of 20 percent reduction constituted a 
breach of its duty of care to take mitigation measures, and 
ordered the government to increase its reduction target to 25 
percent. 137   Similarly, a Pakistani court found that the 
government had made insufficient progress in implementing its 
own national climate change policy.  It not only found a violation 
of constitutional rights, but ordered the government to establish 
a commission to oversee the process of implementation.138 
In the United States a constitutional challenge was brought 
against several federal government agencies for their failure to 
sufficiently limit GHG emissions, and the Federal District Court 
in Oregon surprisingly held (albeit in a judgment on a 
preliminary motion) that the concept of liberty in the due process 
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments gave rise to a 
fundamental right to a “climate capable of sustaining human 
life.”139  But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed this decision, holding that the courts were not the place 
 
135 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, supra note 114; Brunée, supra note 114, at 6. 
136 See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from 
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United 




137 Uregenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, unofficial English translation 
available at:  https://www.urgenda.nl/wp-content/uploads/ENG-Dutch-Supreme-Court-
Urgenda-v-Netherlands-20-12-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFY7-MGX3].  For discussion 
of the Hague Court of Appeal decision, see generally Comparative Law—Climate 
Change—Hague Court of Appeal Requires Dutch Government to Meet Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Reductions by 2020, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2090, 2090–97 (2019). 
138 Leghari v. Federation of Pak., [2015] W.P. No. 25501/201 (Lahore H.Ct.). 
139 Julianna v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). 
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for deciding climate change policy. 140   While this decision is 
deeply disappointing, it is true that litigation is never the best 
mechanism for the implementation and enforcement of legal 
regimes governing highly complex problems implicating a 
diversity of actors.  Litigation can only indirectly mobilize 
compliance ex ante, by way of deterrence.  As the Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros Project case illustrates, it is not even very effective 
at resolving large environmental problems involving only two 
states. 141   The ICJ in that case determined and allocated 
responsibility, ordered further negotiations and reparations.  
Yet, years later, the dispute and underlying problems remain 
largely unresolved.142   Thus, litigation is unlikely to be that 
helpful in mobilizing compliance with the obligations and duties 
regarding reductions in GHG emissions.  All of which is to say 
that as the climate crisis mounts, and the consequences worsen, 
the inability of the international climate change law regime to 
mobilize compliance more generally is going to force people to 
cast about for alternative mechanisms and tools to encourage or 
coerce compliance. 
C. The Causes of Climate Change as Security Threat 
In this Section, we return to the idea that there will soon come 
a time when not only the consequences of climate change are 
seen as a threat to national security, but also that some of the 
causes of climate change will increasingly be viewed by states as 
a national security threat, and ultimately as a threat to 
international peace and security.  To be more precise, the 
conduct of states that results in recklessly excessive 
contributions to climate change, in flagrant violation of 
international climate change law, will come to be seen as a 
national security threat by other states, and will be 
characterized as a threat to international peace and security.  
This idea, that “recklessly excessive and flagrantly unlawful” 
 
140 Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 D.C. No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 
2020). 
141 Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project, supra note 127. 
142 Id.; see generally Gábor Baranyai & Gábor Bartus, Anatomy of a Deadlock:  A Systemic 
Analysis of Why the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dam Dispute is Still Unresolved, 18 WATER 
POL’Y 39, 39–48 (2016). 
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contributions to climate change will be viewed as a threat to 
international peace and security, will thus come to form the 
basis for claims that collective action against such threats will 
be justifiable. 
The development of thinking in this direction is already very 
much in motion.  There have been increasingly frequent 
arguments that climate change should be taken up by the 
Security Council as an issue impacting international peace and 
security.143  Pointing to the actions of individual states as posing 
such threats is merely the next step.  We can already see shifts 
in this direction in public discourse.  For instance, The 
Economist cover story in the first week of August 2019 
characterized Brazil’s deforestation efforts in the Amazon as a 
threat to neighboring countries and to humanity more 
generally—it even analogized Brazil’s conduct to “an act of 
war.”144  An essay in Foreign Policy made a move in the same 
direction, raising the question of whether states had the right—
or even the obligation—to consider using force to protect the 
Amazon. 145   That same week, a feature in The Guardian 
appeared under the title “Australia’s Climate Stance is Inflicting 
Criminal Damage on Humanity.”146 
Nonetheless, from a purely legal perspective, classifying the 
GHG emissions of a particular state as a national security threat, 
and thus a threat to international peace and security, may seem 
both counterintuitive and a massive stretch.  After all, as 
discussed above, each and every country is contributing to 
climate change, so how do we single out only some as comprising 
a threat?  Is it even possible to define what constitutes “excessive” 
GHG emissions?  There are some scholars that challenge this 
very notion.147  And in thinking about what might constitute 
 
143 See infra Part III(A)(i). 
144 Deathwatch:  The Future of the Amazon, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2019) (emphasis added); 
see also Stephen M. Walt, Who Will Save the Amazon (and How)?, FOREIGN POL’Y:  VOICE 
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/05/who-will-invade-brazil-to-save-the-
amazon/ [https://perma.cc/9C4S-BEGG]. 
145 Walt, supra note 144. 
146 Ian Dunlop & David Spratt, Australia’s Climate Stance is Inflicting Criminal Damage 
on Humanity, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/com 
mentisfree/2019/aug/03/australias-climate-stance-is-inflicting-criminal-damage-on-
humanity [https://perma.cc/HTM3-F9NK]. 
147 See, e.g., id.; MAYER, supra note 78, at 79. 
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excessive contributions to climate change, does it make sense to 
think about the problem in purely state-centric fashion?  Canada, 
for instance, has a population of less than 40 million, yet 
contributes absolute carbon dioxide emissions that ranked it in 
the top twelve state contributors in the world in 2015, ahead of 
Indonesia, a country of over a quarter of a billion people.148  
Australia, a country of less than 25 million, has an even higher 
per-capita rate of GHG emissions.149  From that perspective, a 
per-capita emission rate approach might seem more just.  Even 
taking a state-centric approach, how should we treat the 
emissions from China that result directly from industries 
supplying Western markets or from companies within Western 
corporate supply-chains, not to mention the entirely separate 
accounting of maritime and aviation emissions?150  And then, the 
most difficult problem of all:  how to factor in historic emissions?  
The United States alone is responsible for approximately 25 
percent of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.151  Developing 
countries have for years taken the position in negotiations that 
historical emissions have to be considered in establishing 
emission limits.152  The principle of “differentiated responsibility” 
has been reiterated in every UNFCCC agreement, but the 
United States has insisted that the concept cannot be 
 
148 Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 16, 
2008), https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/science/each-count 
rys-share-of-co2.html [https://perma.cc/2RLW-XE7N].  For the database of raw data of 
GHG emissions submitted by each of the state-parties to the UNFCCC, see United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data—
Detailed Data by Party, available at https://di.unfccc.int/detailed_data_by_party 
[hereinafter, UNFCCC GHG emissions database] (last visited April 16, 2020). 
149  UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 148. 
150  The emissions from both maritime and air transportation are not governed by 
UNFCCC, but are governed by the International Maritime Organization and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, and related treaties, and do not get accounted 
for within national emissions.  See MAYER, supra note 76, at 55–59; BODANSKY, supra 
note 76, at 265–73. 
151 See MAYER, supra note 76, at 98–103. 
152  See generally Phillip Stalley, Principled Strategy:  The Role of Equity Norms in 
China’s Climate Change Diplomacy, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1 (2013).  See BODANSKY, 
supra note 76, at 27.  But see generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate 
Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008) (questioning the corrective and distributive 
justice claims against developed countries). 
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interpreted to imply greater historical responsibility. 153  Yet can 
historical emissions be entirely disregarded when considering 
what contributions today are excessive and constitute a threat 
to humanity?154   In short, even if we begin to view reckless 
contributions to climate change as a security threat, there does 
remain the question of precisely how we are to define and 
determine exactly what constitutes recklessly excessive 
contributions to climate change, so as to comprise such a threat. 
As in most areas of social organization, however, the relevant 
legal regime will shape our frame of reference and inform the 
norms that develop around this issue.155  Recklessly excessive 
contributions to climate change will be those that are viewed as 
being in flagrant violation of the prevailing international climate 
change law duties and obligations.  As reviewed in the previous 
section, there is a growing web of well-defined state duties and 
obligations, together with increasingly clear expectations 
regarding each state’s mitigation efforts.  These may not yet be 
operating to adequately mobilize broad compliance, or be 
sufficiently precise and binding so as to provide a high degree of 
certainty in litigation; but they will be clear enough to provide a 
basis for public allegations that certain countries are flagrantly 
offside the rules, and that their contributions are therefore 
recklessly excessive.  The combination of the collective global 
mitigation objectives articulated in the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement, and progressively ambitious and voluntary NDC 
limits of the Paris Agreement, will provide a ready frame of 
reference for such claims.  The regime forms a sufficiently 
developed set of expectations and benchmarks against which 
national policy can and will be measured for purposes of 
determining what constitutes “reasonable” as opposed to 
“recklessly excessive” GHG emissions.  As discussed above, those 
emissions will, in accordance with the approach of the UNFCCC, 
be assessed in terms of the percentage increase or decrease 
 
153 Written Statement of the United States on Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, in 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, ¶ 16, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.151.26 (Vol. IV) (Sept. 28, 1992).  For a review of the principle of 
differentiation, see MAYER, supra note 76,  Chap. 6. 
154 See supra note 101. 
155  For the international context, see, e.g., Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). 
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measured against past emissions benchmarks—given, of course, 
that all states are now obligated to reduce the balance of their 
contributions relative to those past benchmarks.156 
A state engaging in or permitting activity that results in GHG 
emissions and/or destroys carbon sinks, the combined effect of 
which is to constitute a contribution to climate change that is 
sufficiently out of proportion to the state’s treaty commitments, 
would almost certainly also constitute a violation of the 
substantive due diligence obligations of the no-harm principle. 
These due diligence obligations will also be informed by the 
commitment made by the parties to the Paris Agreement to “an 
effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate 
change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge.”157  
I am not here talking about the marginal cases.  What will define 
climate rogue states is activity that will, by most measures and 
from most perspectives, constitute a “flagrant violation” of the 
state’s obligations under both treaty and customary 
international law—and the contributions to climate change that 
give rise to such a flagrant violation will thus be viewed as being 
recklessly excessive.  In this way, what I have termed “recklessly 
excessive” and “flagrantly unlawful” are intricately related.  The 
terminology does not much matter and these are not terms of art, 
but are only employed here for definitional convenience—the 
point is that conduct that is viewed as egregiously unlawful will 
also be seen as patently and unreasonably excessive, and 
together they will define conduct that will be perceived to be an 
unjustifiable threat to the rest of the international community. 
Many may object to this line of argument by suggesting that 
the legal regime is not sufficiently clear, that many elements of 
it are not necessarily binding, and that it is thus impossible to 
determine what would constitute “recklessly excessive 
contributions” even within the legal framework described. 158  
These objections would be more salient if the issue was one of 
trying to build a case for purposes of litigation, and the 
establishment of state responsibility for violation of these 
obligations.  But proving the violations in court is not what is at 
 
156 See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
157 Paris Agreement, see supra note 30, at Preamble. 
158 See Zahar, supra note 119, at 250–51 (disputing the notion of excessive emissions). 
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issue here, and thus the more theoretical legal objections rather 
miss the mark.  The central point is that the legal regime will 
provide the lens through which state activity is assessed, and 
will thus frame the perceptions of risk and threat.  The legal 
framework will provide a significant foundation for powerful 
political arguments about the illegitimacy of the climate change 
contributions of outlier states, and legal arguments will be 
central to the rhetoric deployed to rally collective action against 
the perceived threat posed by those states.  This is a familiar 
pattern.  Consider how the United States and others have 
referred to the principles and rules from the nuclear non-
proliferation or counter-terrorism law regimes to characterize 
the alleged activities of countries like Iran, North Korea, Iraq, 
and Libya as being unlawful and illegitimate, as part of a process 
of characterizing those states as rogue nations for purposes of 
rallying international collective action against them.159  When 
the consequences of climate change start to wreak real havoc, 
and as fear and the sense of urgency and crisis galvanize both 
governments and publics alike around the world, the pressure to 
both take significant action to reduce the threat, and to target 
scapegoats viewed as having helped cause the crisis, is going to 
become enormous—and the relevant legal regime will help 
frame the arguments to justify collective action against the 
rogue states.  While this catastrophe will dwarf all others that 
have come before it, there is a common pattern of governments 
seeking to blame other states for perceived crises.160 
 
159 See, e.g., Mahsa Rouhi, From Rogue to Regular:  What will it take for Washington to 
accept Iran as a “normal” state?, FOREIGN POL’Y:  ARGUMENT (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/04/from-rogue-state-to-regular-iran-trump-sanctions-
bolton-pompeo-normal-state/ [https://perma.cc/46QS-WJPC].  President George W. Bush 
described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union 
Address.  Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 
2002) www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/LT3Q-E76U]. 
160 Two recent examples of this pattern in the context of migration, are the Italian 
government’s blaming of France for the perceived migration crisis, and the Trump 
administration blaming Mexico for migrant caravans heading for the Southern border:  
France Summons Italian Envoy Over Africa Remarks, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46955006 [https://perma.cc/3G8Z-AT6S]; Mary 
Lee, Trump Blames Mexico and Democrats for Migrant Caravan, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/22/trump-immigration-crisis-921892 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5WB4-3MTE]. 
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In the circumstances of the climate change crisis, if some 
country flagrantly rejects the calls for international cooperation 
on climate change and pursues its own economic self-interest at 
the cost of contributing disproportionately to the risk that the 
whole world is facing, then many countries in the world will 
begin to view that state as a renegade, a rogue that is putting 
humanity at risk, and will seek action to stop it, regardless of 
complex theoretical or fine legal arguments militating against 
such a characterization.  Thus, if Brazil announces it is going to 
permit the accelerating destruction of the Amazonian rain-
forest, 161  or Canada adopts policies to maximize the 
development and production of its tar-sands oil fields,162 and 
doing so is going to put those countries far offside their well-
established climate change mitigation obligations, their actions 
are going to be perceived as a threat to the rest of humanity. And 
that threat is going to begin eliciting a demand for a more direct 
response—even a military response.  In a political climate 
characterized by fear, a sense of crisis, and urgent need to 
respond, the characterization of the threats posed by climate 
rogue states will be stripped of all complexity and nuance, 
packaged in tribalistic or nationalistic terms, and there will be 
demands for action to prevent those threats from materializing.  
And as states have so often responded to threats posed by 
“others” in the past, the threat or use of force will be one of the 
primary policy tools for which governments will reach—and then 
governments will begin to look for legal arguments to provide 
the justification for using that tool. 
This is not to suggest that the violations of the international 
climate change law obligations could ever, by themselves, justify 
a use of force under current international law.  In Part III below, 
I will turn to a more detailed analysis of the kinds of arguments 
we are likely to see for justifying the use of force, but for now it 
 
161  See, e.g., Dom Phillips, Jair Bolsonaro launches assault on Amazon rainforest 
protections, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/ 
brazil-jair-bolsonaro-amazon-rainforest-protections [https://perma.cc/6VP2-HK2P].  See 
Xavantina & Santarém, supra note 54; see Walt, supra note 144. 
162 Stephen Leahy & Ian Willms, This is the World’s Most Destructive Oil Operation—
And it’s Growing, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic. 
com/environment/2019/04/alberta-canadas-tar-sands-is-growing-but-indigenous-people-
fight-back/ [https://perma.cc/V83K-HZ95]. 
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should be made clear that a finding of violation, flagrant or 
otherwise, and even the establishment of state responsibility for 
that violation, could not in and of itself justify a use of force, or 
even contribute to or bolster any such justification.163  It is well 
established and uncontroversial that the law of state 
responsibility is quite separate and apart from the jus ad bellum 
regime, and it cannot be relied upon for any justifications for the 
use of force.164  But my point is that regardless of this, such 
illegality will help to both define what is recklessly excessive and 
thus threatening, and to shape and legitimize the political 
rhetoric employed to galvanize collective action against the 
rogue state.  And that such political calls for action in turn will 
drive efforts to expand or adjust the jus ad bellum regime to 
provide the justification necessary for the threat or use of force, 
in just the same way we have seen efforts to adjust the regime 
to deal with other novel and challenging threats.  The 
unlawfulness of the rogue state’s actions will be implicated in 
those arguments, just as violations of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty were implicated in arguments for the use of 
force against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. 
If all of this sounds far-fetched, consider how the issues 
surrounding geoengineering may sharpen the case for action.  
Geoengineering refers to various technical methods designed to 
counter the process of climate change.  One area of 
geoengineering that is already the subject of considerable 
theoretical and experimental work, referred to as “solar 
geoengineering” or “solar radiation management,” seeks to 
reduce the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere by reducing 
its exposure to the sun. 165   Some proposed solutions are 
 
163 This is precisely part of my criticism of the implication of state responsibility and the 
“no-harm” principle in recent articulations of the “unwilling or unable” doctrine—to 
which I will return below.  For my full critique of this, see Craig Martin, Challenging and 
Refining the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387, 429–33 
(2019). 
164 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 18, at 206 (2013).  See generally CHRISTINE GRAY, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (4th ed. 2018); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (6th ed. 2017). 
165 For a brief overview, see Reaching for the Sunshade July 2030: What if geoengineering 
goes rogue?, ECONOMIST (July 6, 2019), https://www.economist.com/the-world-
if/2019/07/06/what-if-geoengineering-goes-rogue [https://perma.cc/U5QJ-ZYVS].  For a 
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somewhat fantastical, such as placing millions of mirrors or 
shades in outer space between the earth and the sun.  Other are 
much more technically and financially feasible, such as salting 
the lower atmosphere with sulphate particles, or Sulfuric acid, 
in an effort to mimic the cooling effect seen after large volcanic 
eruptions.  Just one by-product of this scheme would be to vastly 
increase the acidification of the oceans, and thereby radically 
impact marine ecosystems and the biodiversity of the planet.166  
Another proposed technique is to modify or eliminate cirrus 
clouds, which form at high altitudes and trap more heat than 
they reflect, by injecting them with such chemicals as bismuth 
tri-iodide, the unintended consequences of which are not yet well 
understood.167 
Consider a situation in which a country that has both the 
technical and financial ability, but is also one of those acutely 
vulnerable to climate change—such as India—announces that it 
is going to undertake a bold and radical geoengineering effort to 
mitigate the consequences of climate change.  The full effects are 
poorly understood, and the rest of the world objects because the 
consequences of the effort are considered to be potentially 
disastrous for the climate system and for biodiversity.  States 
argue that implementation of the plan will clearly violate the no-
harm principle, among a host of other possible violations of 
international law.  India brushes all objections aside and 
announces its intention to proceed with the effort without the 
consent of the rest of the world.  Would its proposed action not 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, justifying 
collective action rising to and including the threat or use of force?  
I suspect that many states would think so—and the primary 
differences between the geoengineering effort and the reckless 
contribution to climate change are really just the temporal 
component and motives.  But killing someone slowly with a daily 
dose of chemo is no less fatal than doing so with a gun, even if 
they think they are helping with the former. 
 
full-length critique of geoengineering, see CLIVE HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS:  THE DAWN 
OF THE AGE OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING (2013). 
166 For detailed discussion, see HAMILTON, supra note 165, at 51–71. 
167 Id. 
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While governments will thus view excessive state 
contributions to climate change as direct threats to international 
peace and security, and look to the climate change law regime to 
help identify which states are “rogue” actors most responsible 
for the threat, they will also look for legal justifications for 
collective action against such rogue states.  I next turn to 
examine the nature of the arguments that we are likely to see 
advanced for expanding the jus ad bellum regime to justify such 
action. 
III. PRESSURE TO EXPAND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME 
As indicated in the introduction, there has been very little 
consideration of how any of the foregoing might implicate the jus 
ad bellum regime.  We may acknowledge that the consequences 
of climate change will both increasingly pose national security 
threats, and increase the incidence of armed conflict; we may 
recognize that some countries may recklessly contribute to those 
risks through the flagrant violation of increasingly firm 
principles of international climate change law; and indeed we 
may concede that other international law regimes are incapable 
of enforcing or mobilizing sufficient compliance with those 
international climate change law obligations.  But there has 
been little sense that these developments could somehow 
combine to exert pressure on the jus ad bellum regime to adapt, 
or indeed that the jus ad bellum regime could have some role to 
play in addressing climate change.  More specifically, nothing in 
the academic literature appears to have seriously contemplated 
a future in which states might look to the threat or use of force 
as a means of compelling recalcitrant states to comply with their 
climate change law obligations, and thereby reduce the threat 
posed by excessive GHG emissions to their own national security 
and to international peace and security more generally.  In this 
Part, I explore how such developments are indeed likely to cause 
pressure for adjustments to the jus ad bellum regime, and 
examine recent efforts to expand the doctrine of self-defense and 
create new exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, as a 
basis for suggesting the form such pressure is likely to take. 
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A. Threat to International Peace and Security 
To begin, it may be helpful to recall the outlines of the modern 
jus ad bellum regime.  It is centered around the general 
prohibition on the use of force, which is provided for in Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter and is also well established as a 
principle of customary international law. 168   There are two 
generally accepted exceptions to the prohibition, both of which 
are also explicitly provided for in the U.N. Charter: under Article 
42, the U.N. Security Council can authorize member states to 
use force to maintain or restore international peace and security; 
and under Article 51, member states may unilaterally use force 
in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense in response 
to an armed attack.169 I will begin with U.N. Security Council 
authorized action first, because it is most likely that the initial 
moves along the path towards implicating the jus ad bellum 
regime will begin not with calls for a use of force, but merely 
with claims that the conduct of the climate rogue state should be 
understood as constituting a threat to international peace and 
security requiring some form of collective action. And this is a 
first step towards triggering Article 42 action. 
1. Framework of U.N. Security Council Role 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter lays out a collective security 
framework, and its first provision, Article 39, provides that the 
Security Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”170  Indeed, the U.N. Security 
Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of 
international peace and security,171 and thus the identification 
of a threat to international peace and security is typically 
 
168 On the relationship between the Charter and customary principles of jus ad bellum, 
see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 392, ¶ 178–88 (June 27, 1986). 
169 For a review of the jus ad bellum regime under the Charter, see generally GRAY, supra 
note 164 and DINSTEIN, supra note 164. 
170 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
171 U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
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understood as a pre-condition for a matter to be taken up by the 
Security Council.  There has been some discussion of the impact 
of climate change in the Security Council, and the Security 
Council signaled in Resolution 1625, in 2005, that it was 
prepared to “adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention, which 
addresses the root causes of armed conflict.”172   In 2014 the 
Security Council recognized that a public health issue, namely 
the Ebola crisis in West Africa, could be characterized as a 
threat to international peace and security.173  As early as 1992, 
it indicated that instability in economic, social, humanitarian 
and ecological fields could constitute threats to international 
peace and security and, in 2007, it conducted an open debate on 
the issue of climate change.  Nonetheless, the Security Council 
has not yet characterized the consequences of climate change as 
a threat to international peace and security, nor has it agreed to 
be seized of the issue.174  Russia, China, and the United States 
have particularly resisted such moves, as well as many of the 
major developing countries such as Brazil, though the United 
Kingdom has worked to get climate change on the Security 
Council’s agenda.175  The reasons for resistance vary, but there 
are increasing voices calling for the Security Council to take up 
the issue, and there are even some scholars who have suggested 
that the Security Council could employ its collective security 
mechanisms to enforce climate change law.176 
 
172  S.C.Res. 1625, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1625 (Sept. 14, 2005).  See also, e.g., SILKE MARIE 
CHRISTIANSEN, CLIMATE CONFLICTS—A CASE OF INTERNATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 149–88 (2016), and see generally Ben Saul, Climate Change, Conflict and Security:  
International Law Challenges, 9 N.Z. ARMED FORCES L. REV. 1 (2009). 
173 S.C. Res. 2177, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2177 (2014).  See Craig Gaver, Will the UN Security 
Council Act on COVID-19?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 4, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/ 
04/04/covid-19-symposium-will-the-un-security-council-act-on-covid-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/BX9A-24HW]. 
174 See Saul, supra note 172; Ramsden, supra note 3; see also Pierre Thielbörger, Climate 
Change and International Peace and Security: Time for a Green Security Council? in, 
FROM COLD WAR TO CYBER WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 
AND ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS  (H.J. Heintze & P. Thielberger eds., 
2016); see generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (Shirley V. Scott 
& Charlotte Ku eds., 2018). 
175  Francesco Sindico, Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue? 29 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 29, 30–34 (2007); Saul, supra note 172. 
176 See, e.g., Trina Ng, Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World:  A Role 
for the Security Council, 15 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 275, 278–79 (2010); Shirley V. Scott & 
Charlotte Ku, The UN Security Council and Global Action on Climate Change, in 
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Given that an increasing number of governments are 
characterizing climate change as a national security threat,177 
and legislatures at various levels of government are passing 
declarations of “climate emergency,”178 it seems only a matter of 
time before states begin to also characterize the risks and 
consequences of climate change more precisely as a threat to 
international peace and security—and to press the Security 
Council to declare it as such and to take up the issue for 
deliberation.  This will be an important conceptual shift, from 
first viewing climate change as a naturally occurring 
environmental crisis, to then seeing the consequences of climate 
change as a national security threat, to finally viewing the 
causes of climate change—in the form of the states that 
recklessly contribute to the risk—as constituting a “threat to 
international peace and security.”  If the Security Council does 
take up the issue of climate change and identifies the 
consequences of climate change as a threat to international 
peace and security, it will then be an entirely natural and 
feasible step for it to characterize the recklessly excessive 
contributions to climate change of a climate rogue state as also 
constituting a threat to international peace and security.179  And, 
in accordance with Art. 39 and the framework of Chapter VII of 
the Charter, that will trigger the possibility of initiating the 
operation of a number of different collective security 
mechanisms. 180   The Security Council can pass resolutions 
mounting increasing diplomatic pressure, including the 
imposition of “provisional measures” under Art. 40,181 followed 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1–24 (Shirley V. Scott and Charlotte 
Ku eds., 2018); and Christopher K. Penny, Climate Change as a ‘Threat to International 
Peace and Security’, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 25–46 (Shirley 
V. Scott & Charlotte Ku eds., 2018). 
177 See sources and accompanying text, supra notes 35–36. 
178 As of August, 2019, 935 jurisdictions and local governments, representing over 200 
million people, had issued climate emergency declarations see CLIMATE EMERGENCY 
DECLARATION, https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declaratio 
ns-cover-15-million-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/96GK-TBTF] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
179 Penny, supra note 176, at 26. 
180 See generally GARY WILSON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY (2014). 
181 U.N. Charter art. 40. 
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by the imposition of increasingly punitive economic sanctions 
under Art. 41.182 
This has been the well-worn path in dealing with states like 
Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, the nuclear weapons programs of 
which were determined to pose a threat to international peace 
and security.  Collective action in these cases involved the 
authorization and imposition of economic sanctions regimes that 
were increasingly severe, and also increasingly targeted, 
identifying individuals in key government positions and even 
within private enterprise as the subject of sanctions.183  And, of 
course, in the event that such measures are unsuccessful in 
bringing about a change in the conduct or policy of the target 
state, the Security Council can authorize member states to use 
force to maintain or restore international peace and security 
under Art. 42.  The U.N. Security Council has authorized such 
action in the case of the Korean Conflict in 1950, the Gulf War 
of 1990, and the intervention in Libya in 2011, to name just some 
well-known instances.184  While the first two were actions to 
repel acts of aggression, since the 1990s the Security Council has 
authorized the use of force to respond to more varied threats to 
international peace and security.185  Many of these were lower 
levels of force, including peace enforcement operations that 
morphed out of peacekeeping operations, as in the case of 
Somalia in the 1990s.186  Of course, the U.S. and the U.K. have 
argued that the Security Council effectively authorized the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 with Resolution 1441, in response to the 
perceived threat of Iraq’s development of weapons of mass 
 
182 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
183  See generally, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
RECONSIDERED (3d ed., 2007); Alexandra Hofer, The Efficacy of Targeted Sanctions in 
Enforcing Compliance with International Law, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 163, 163–64 (2019). 
184 Though there remains some controversy over whether the Gulf War of 1991 was an 
exercise of collective self-defense under Art. 51, or collective security operation under Art. 
42, or both: see, DINSTEIN, supra note 164, at 323–26 (arguing that it was primarily an 
exercise of collective self-defense), and THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE:  STATE 
ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 26–28 (2002).  
185 See generally THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE BASED APPROACH 
(Tom Ruys & Olivier Corten eds., 2018). 
186 Terry Gill & Kinga Tibori-Szabó, The Intervention in Somalia—1992–95, in THE USE 
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A CASE-BASED APPROACH (Tom Ruys & Olivier 
Corten eds., 2018). 
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destruction. 187   The question of whether the U.N. Security 
Council actually authorized the invasion remains highly 
controversial.  However, there is no question that the Security 
Council was seized of the issue and debated whether to issue 
another resolution authorizing all necessary means to force Iraq 
to comply with previous resolutions, in an effort to prevent Iraq 
from developing a nuclear weapon.188  And, the 2011 Libyan 
intervention was authorized for the purposes of preventing the 
Qadhafi regime from inflicting a humanitarian disaster in 
Benghazi, and is commonly referred to as a prime example of 
humanitarian intervention.189 
2. Humanitarian Intervention as Precedent—Atmospheric 
Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is particularly important to our 
analysis, for it provides a precedent that will likely be considered 
highly salient by those beginning to think about the use of force 
as a means of modifying the behavior of climate rogue states.  
There are two distinct theoretical formulations of humanitarian 
intervention.  Both involve military intervention within a state 
to prevent a humanitarian disaster, typically in the form of 
crimes against humanity or war crimes perpetrated by the forces 
of the state’s own government; but under one formulation this 
intervention must be authorized by the U.N. Security Council, 
while under the second formulation the use of force is 
undertaken without Security Council authority, and thus 
represents a new exception to the prohibition on the use of force. 
 
187 S.C. Res. 1441, (Nov. 8, 2002).  For contemporaneous analysis of this argument, see 
Memorandum to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, from Lord Goldsmith, 
Attorney General (Mar. 7, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/apr/ 
28/election2005.uk [https://perma.cc/RQ6D-TPRQ]. 
188 For detailed analysis of the lead up to the war, see 1 THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY 
(Jul. 2016), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122743/ 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/ [https://perma.cc/5K6P-8GHZ] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2020). 
189 S.C. Res. 1973, (Mar. 17, 2011).  On the operation, see, e.g., Ashley Deeks, The NATO 
Intervention in Libya—2011, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:  A CASE-
BASED APPROACH 749, 751 (Tom Ruys & Oliver Corten eds., 2018).  It should be noted 
that the Libya case remains controversial, with claims that NATO went far beyond the 
authority provided by the U.N. Security Council—but that does not change the nature of 
the initial authority. 
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The basic idea of humanitarian intervention is not new, being 
traceable back as far as Vattel and Grotius, and its more modern 
form to Phillimore in the Nineteenth Century.190  But it was not 
explicitly recognized or provided for in the creation of the 
modern jus ad bellum regime under the U.N. system.  In the late 
1990s, however, with the international community’s failure to 
prevent the Rwanda genocide, followed by the unauthorized 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in the name of humanitarian 
objectives, there were increasing claims that some allowance 
had to be made for such interventions.191  Some argued that 
while such interventions should ideally be authorized by the 
Security Council, if such authority was not possible then 
interventions should be permissible under a new exception to 
the general prohibition on the use of force.192  They supported 
this claim by pointing out that Security Council paralysis was 
precisely the problem in the case of both Rwanda and Kosovo.  
Others have insisted that such intervention is permissible if and 
only if the UN Security Council authorizes it under Art. 42 of the 
Charter.193  The Libya intervention in 2011 is touted as the 
primary example for such an authorized intervention. 
The theoretical support for the principle of humanitarian 
intervention was provided by the “responsibility to protect” 
doctrine, commonly referred to as R2P, which was developed by 
an international commission in 2000 and presented to the U.N. 
General Assembly in 2001.194  The theoretical claim of R2P is 
 
190 STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS:  A GENERAL HISTORY loc 2751 (Kindle 
ed. 2005); see generally GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE:  THE ORIGINS OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2008). 
191  See generally Christine Gray, The Use of Force for Humanitarian Purposes, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW at 12–14 (Nigel 
White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013); Sir Nigel Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller 
ed., Kindle ed., 2018). 
192 See, e.g., Harold H. Koh, Humanitarian Intervention:  Time for Better Law, 111 AJIL 
UNBOUND 287 (2017); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”, 
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824 (1999). 
193 Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 191. 
194  See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:  REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001).  R2P is also explained 
in THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND 
CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (2004), and in KOFI 
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that states have a responsibility to protect the people within 
their territory and under their jurisdiction, and that states 
effectively abdicate or lose some of their sovereign rights against 
outside interference when they violate that responsibility by 
engaging in such atrocities as crimes against humanity, 
genocide, or systemic war crimes against segments of their own 
population. 195   An additional rationale for Security Council 
involvement and authorization, is that when a state engages in 
such atrocities within its own territory, there is a significant 
possibility that there will be conflict, even civil war, which in 
turn may spill over international borders.  In other words, these 
are situations that actually constitute threats to international 
peace and security, justifying U.N. Security Council action.196 
It should be readily apparent how this doctrine will likely 
suggest itself as an appealing precedent for those who think that 
forceful intervention within the affairs of climate rogue states 
may be warranted.  As discussed below, the claim of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention as a third exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force remains controversial, and is not 
yet established law.  However, the idea of such intervention as 
authorized by the security council is now a reasonably well 
settled doctrine. 197   It contemplates U.N. Security Council 
authorization of forceful intervention within the territory and 
affairs of another state, even though that state has not directly 
threatened—far less actually used force against—another state.  
Authorization of such intervention is justified primarily on the 
grounds that it is necessary for humanitarian purposes—to 
defend the people of that state from the actions of their own 
government or to prevent instability and potential for conflict 
within the international system. 
One can foresee the argument that forceful intervention to 
prevent reckless contributions to global climate change by a 
 
ANAN, IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
FOR ALL (2005).  See also Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: From an Idea to 
an International Norm, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:  THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15–29 (Richard H. Cooper & Juliette Voïnov Kohler eds., 2009). 
195 Evans, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 194 at 19. 
196 Gray, supra note 191, at 12–14; Rodley, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 191, 
at 775–96.  
197 See Gray, Humanitarian Purposes, supra note 191. 
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rogue state, is even more justifiable than intervention to prevent 
humanitarian disaster within a state.  If R2P suggests that a 
state abdicates or loses some of its sovereign rights by virtue of 
failing to fulfil the responsibility it owes to its own people, then 
a fortiori, a state should forfeit some of its sovereign rights when 
it is appreciably increasing the risks that climate change poses 
to all of humanity.198  If forceful intervention against a state is 
justified on humanitarian grounds because of the risk the regime 
is creating for the population within that state, then surely 
forceful intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds 
because of the increased risk that the state is creating for all of 
humanity.  If forceful intervention is permissible in response to 
the risk that atrocities within the state might create conflicts 
that spill across borders, thereby threatening international 
peace and security, then surely forceful intervention is 
permissible in response to excessive contributions to climate 
change, the consequences of which will likely lead to increased 
and widespread armed conflict and thereby undermine 
international peace and security.  Or so the argument would go, 
and it would likely gain some traction. 
The chance of the Security Council actually authorizing such 
an atmospheric intervention is, of course, extremely remote, if 
only because several of the permanent members may well be 
candidates for the status of climate rogue state.  But it is likely 
that there will be increasing pressure on the Security Council to 
at least address the issue, and to characterize the consequences 
of climate change, if not yet the causes, as a threat to 
international peace and security.  That characterization alone 
will be important, as it will help to reframe how the crisis is 
debated and even how the public understands and discusses the 
issue.  What is more, once there has been such a characterization 
of the problem as constituting a threat to international peace 
and security, there will be efforts to work around the Security 
Council, just as there have been in the context of humanitarian 
 
198 This claim assumes a certain understanding of sovereignty, that is that it is a concept 
that reflects the level of autonomy of states in their relationship with other states under 
international law, and not purely as a more Hobbesian concept that describes the 
relationship between sovereign and subjects.  For some discussion of the distinction, see 
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–22 (6th ed., 2008). 
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intervention.  Libya was an exceptional case, and the Security 
Council has more often refused to authorize such interventions, 
as tragically illustrated by the case of Syria.199 
In the face of such dysfunctional paralysis, there have been 
increasing calls to permit the U.N. General Assembly to provide 
authority for such interventions.200  This revives an idea that 
had its conception in the so-called “Uniting for Peace” Resolution 
of the General Assembly in 1950.201  This was a resolution to 
recommend authorization for the use of force by member states 
in order to respond to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 
following the Soviet veto of an authorizing resolution in the 
Security Council.  It has been referred to in a number of General 
Assembly resolutions since, condemning acts of aggression and 
alien occupation.202  It had particular salience during the Cold 
War, when the paralysis of the Security Council was at its height, 
but there have been more recent efforts to resurrect the idea 
specifically to authorize humanitarian intervention.203 
There are many objections to the idea of relying upon the 
General Assembly to authorize humanitarian intervention.  
Some objections involve technical forays into the proper 
interpretation of the Charter itself, and thus the proper scope of 
authority and jurisdiction the General Assembly may have with 
regard to issues of international peace and security.  These 
arguments have been explored and debated by others.204  It is 
sufficient for our purposes to note that persuasive arguments 
have been made in support of the proposition that the General 
Assembly could authorize a use of force under certain 
 
199 See generally Graham Melling & Anne Dennett, The Security Council Veto and Syria:  
Responding to Mass Atrocities Through the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, 57 INDIAN J. 
INT’L L. 285 (2017). 
200 Id.  See also Ramsden, supra note 3. 
201 G.A. Res. 377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950).  See generally Ramsden, supra note 3, Melling & 
Dennett, supra note 199; FRANCK, supra note 184, at 33–38. 
202  See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, ¶ 1971 (2009); U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, ¶362, 1201 
(2014); U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69, ¶ 139 (2015). 
203 See generally Ramsden, supra note 3; Melling & Dennett, supra note 199. See also 
FRANCK, supra note 184, at 37–38. 
204 Id. 
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conditions. 205   And again, as compared to the case of 
humanitarian intervention, these arguments are augmented by 
some powerful new considerations in the case of climate change 
and atmospheric intervention.  The risk of harm posed by 
climate change threatens people all over the world, not just those 
of one state, and the consequences of climate change are going 
to affect the least developed states far more severely and far 
sooner than it affects the most developed states.  Those least 
responsible for climate change are the most vulnerable to the 
harm it will cause—they will be the worst affected, and they are 
the least able to either mitigate or accommodate the 
consequences of climate change.206  This is one aspect of the 
concept of “differentiation” in the climate change law 
instruments.  This feature of climate change surely militates in 
favor of a more democratic process, one that gives more of a voice 
for the most vulnerable, for determining if, when, and against 
whom force should be used in an effort to mitigate the 
consequences of climate change.  The developing world will 
certainly be making these arguments as the consequences of the 
crisis begin to mount. 
B. Expanding the Unilateral Exceptions to the Use of Force 
Given the difficulty of obtaining Security Council authority, 
and questions regarding the validity and legitimacy of any 
General Assembly authority, there will be pressure to either 
expand the one unilateral exception to the prohibition on the use 
of force, or to create a new exception.  The only current unilateral 
exception is the right of states to use force in the exercise of 
individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed 
attack, provided for in Article 51 of the Charter.207  There have 
already been arguments for just such expansions in the last 
couple of decades, in response to threats that were claimed to be 
new, novel, or difficult to address under current law.  These 
claims also called for expanding the right of self-defense itself, 
 
205 Id. 
206 INCROPERA, supra note 9, at 215–16; MAYER, supra note 76, at 90–98. 
207 U.N. Charter; art. 51; see generally TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF 
THE UN CHARTER:  EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 368–510 (2010); see 
generally GRAY, supra note 164. 
MARTIN-MACRO-041820 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/20  12:26 AM 
384 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:S 
 
to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction, 
transnational terrorism, or the threat of cyber attacks; and for 
the creation of a new exception to allow for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.  These recent efforts to expand the 
scope of exceptions to the prohibition, or to put it another way, 
attempts to lower the threshold for the use of force, are like ruts 
in the road that will likely be followed in the coming efforts to 
adjust the jus ad bellum regime to address threats posed by 
excessive and unlawful contributions to climate change.  It is 
instructive, therefore, to examine some of these arguments in 
more detail, not only to see how they are likely to form the 
blueprint for future arguments, but to assess how powerful their 
rationales might be in the context of responses to the climate 
change crisis.  I begin with the arguments for expanding the 
doctrine of self-defense. 
1. Self-Defense 
It may be helpful to briefly review the essential elements of 
the doctrine of self-defense.  The exact contours and operation of 
the doctrine continue to be the subject of considerable debate, 
some of which is driven by the very efforts to expand the doctrine 
that we will examine below.208  The starting point is the idea that 
the right of self-defense permits the use of force in response to 
an armed attack.  There is debate over both what level of force 
constitutes an armed attack, and whether states may also use 
force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack—and indeed, 
if so, how one defines imminence.209  We need not delve into the 
different strands of this debate now, but simply note that “armed 
attack” is the triggering event for the exercise of the right, and 
that an armed attack is understood to be, at a minimum, a use 
of force as that term is used in Article 2(4) of the Charter—and 
the dominant view is that a use of force must be considerably 
more grave than the threshold level contemplated by Article 2(4) 
 
208 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 164, at ch. 4; DINSTEIN, supra note 164, at chs. 7–8; RUYS, 
supra note 207, at 53–125. 
209 See generally, RUYS, supra note 207.  For my examination of these issues, see Martin, 
Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163. 
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to qualify as an armed attack.210  In addition, if the armed attack 
was launched by a non-state actor (“NSA”) operating within the 
territory of some other state, the victim of the armed attack 
cannot justifiably use force in self-defense against the NSA 
within the territory of that other state, unless the actions of the 
NSA can be attributed to the territorial state.  Such attribution 
requires that there be a sufficient nexus between the NSA and 
the territorial state, typically requiring a “substantial 
involvement” in the activity of the NSA, or some level of control 
over them.211  Finally, the use of force in response to an armed 
attack must be both necessary and proportionate, meaning that 
the use of force is the only means of effectively responding to the 
attack, and that the use of force is proportionate to the harm 
that will be caused by the attack if it is not prevented.212  These 
elements should be borne in mind as we review the argument 
below for expansion of the doctrine. 
Among the arguments for expanding the jus ad bellum regime 
for purposes of responding to climate change, those seeking an 
expansion of the doctrine of self-defense would confront the most 
difficult obstacles—and, as I will argue below, they should 
indeed be rejected outright.  As we will see, although these 
arguments have much in common with recent efforts to expand 
the doctrine of self-defense, they will need to push the envelope 
quite a bit further than those recent efforts.  First and foremost, 
in the context of climate change, the use of force would not be 
responding to any armed attack at all, whether actual, imminent, 
in the distant future, or otherwise.  Rather, it would be 
responding to an unlawful and excessive contribution to a risk, 
the materialization of which will be spread over time and space.  
The harm is neither localized, nor temporally fixed—it will be 
ongoing, worsening, and materializing in various forms 
 
210 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27), ¶¶ 191, 210–11, 230–32; see also RUYS, supra note 207, at 139–
57. 
211 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 194–95; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19), ¶¶ 106–47 (explaining, based on the 
facts presented by Uganda, that Uganda was not acting in self-defense); see also GRAY, 
supra note 164, at 139–45, 226. 
212 GRAY, supra note 164, at 157–63.  But see DINSTEIN, supra note 164, at 282. 
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everywhere in the world.  What is more, all states, including the 
defending states themselves, are also contributing to the same 
risk, albeit to a lesser extent.  This leads to very serious 
problems of causality and attribution.  For instance, even if 
Canada embarks on a policy to produce and consume tar sands 
oil at levels that are in flagrant and reckless disregard of its 
climate change law obligations,213 Mexico will have considerable 
difficulty in claiming that Canada’s particular emissions are the 
proximate cause of any specific increased threat to the national 
security of Mexico so as to approximate anything remotely 
analogous to an armed attack.  Thus, the arguments for 
expanding the doctrine of self-defense will need to dispense with 
the need for armed attack altogether, and substitute some new 
concept as a triggering event.  This new triggering event will 
have to be formulated in a manner that is satisfied by a 
recklessly excessive contribution to climate change in flagrant 
violation of climate change law. 
This may seem an extremely tall and unlikely mountain to 
climb, and yet the arguments marshalled in favor of other efforts 
to expand the doctrine have similarly attempted to weaken the 
concept of armed attack as the triggering event, perverted the 
concept of imminence and thereby undermined the principle of 
necessity, and even weakened aspects of causality and 
attribution in the doctrine of self-defense.  I have criticized 
several of these claims elsewhere,214 and I do not mean to be 
understood here as changing my position on them.  But each 
effort was mounted in response to perceived new threats, and 
provides a blueprint of how similar claims are likely to be made 
and received in the context of the threats posed by climate 
change.  Further, the nature of the arguments likely to be made 
in the context of climate change do not look quite so far-fetched 
or extreme when carefully compared in detail with the other 
claims already made for expanding the doctrine of self-defense.  
 
213 Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 because it was going to be in 
violation of its obligations, in large measure due to the emissions associated with the 
Alberta tar sands industry.  See Austen, supra note 78. 
214 See generally, e.g., Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163; Craig 
Martin, Going Medieval:  Targeted Killing, Self-Defense, and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, 
in TARGETED KILLINGS:  LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 223 (Claire 
Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012). 
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Indeed, as I will examine below, the over-arching objection to all 
such claims for expansion—namely, that the risk posed by 
weakening the jus ad bellum regime is substantially greater 
than the risk posed by the threats such changes are designed to 
address—is less compelling in the context of the potentially 
existential threats posed by climate change.  Or, to put it 
another way, the rationale for expanding the jus ad bellum to 
deal with the threats posed by climate change is far more 
persuasive than the grounds for recent efforts to adjust the 
doctrine.  With that, let us examine some of those recent efforts. 
a. Preventative self-defense 
In the context of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States 
argued that states could use force in self-defense against states 
in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction, 
notwithstanding that an armed attack was not imminent in the 
traditional sense.215  Proponents of this so-called “preventative 
self-defense” claimed that the magnitude of the harm posed by 
weapons of mass destruction created such an existential threat 
that states could use force in response, even though the putative 
“armed attack” was neither certain nor looming in the 
immediate future.216  The effort sought to expand the concept of 
anticipatory self-defense through a radical stretching of the 
temporal component of the concept of imminence.  Under this 
new formulation of the concept, in situations where there is only 
some as yet speculative possibility of an armed attack sometime 
in the future, but the magnitude of harm posed by such an attack 
is huge, resulting from the use of weapons of mass destruction, 
then such future armed attack could be characterized as 
 
215 The US assertion of the right to a preventative self-defense was made in 2002, see 
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 13–15 (Sept. 2002).  For analysis of the debate, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 
164, at 221–28; RUYS, supra note 207, at 250–54; see generally W. Michael Reisman & 
Andrea Armstrong, Centennial Essay:  The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive 
Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525 (2006); see generally David A. Sadoff, A Question of 
Determinacy:  The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523 
(2009). 
216 See, e.g., John A. Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory 
Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 315 (2003); see 
also Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 513, 545–47(2003). 
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imminent and the use of force in response necessary.  This 
formulation of imminence almost gutted the concept of its 
temporal meaning, and thus undermined the principle of 
necessity that is central to the doctrine of self-defense.217 
In addition to the violence done to the concept of imminence, 
and thus the principle of necessity, the centrality of the concept 
of “armed attack” as the triggering event was also significantly 
undermined.  While technically still in place as the conceptual 
trigger, the “armed attack” receded over the temporal horizon 
and was entirely speculative, while the true triggering event was 
the calculation of unacceptable risk.  It is precisely for these 
reasons that the doctrine of preventative self-defense has been 
widely rejected.218  But it is nonetheless instructive that the 
claims were developed in response to the perceived threat of Iraq 
developing weapons of mass destruction, advanced vigorously by 
the government of the United States, as well as by a significant 
number of academics, policy makers, and jurists.  These claims 
continue to be raised in debates over responses to Iran and North 
Korea.219  Moreover, the claims influenced the development of a 
separate effort to expand the doctrine, to which I turn next. 
b. The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine 
Arguments made to develop and legitimize the so-called 
“unwilling or unable” doctrine similarly sought to expand the 
doctrine of self-defense. 220   This expansion was deemed 
necessary to justify the uses of force against NSAs within the 
territory of non-consenting states, precisely because it was 
difficult to justify such a use of force under the traditional 
framework of the doctrine of self-defense.  The strikes against 
NSAs undertaken by the United States were often in response 
 
217 Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163; see generally RUYS, supra note 
207, at ch. 4. 
218 DINSTEIN, supra note 164, at 221–28; RUYS, supra note 207, at 322–42 (providing 
detailed primary sources as evidence of governments rejecting the Bush Doctrine). 
219 For review of the debate, see, e.g., Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-
Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005). 
220 The seminal work advancing the doctrine is Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against 
An Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770 (2012) 
[hereinafter Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs]; Daniel Bethlehem, Principles of 
Self-Defense—A Brief Response, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 579 (2013) [hereinafter Bethlehem, 
A Brief Response]. 
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to activity that did not rise to the level of armed attack, were 
said to be in response to future threats that did not satisfy the 
traditional concept of imminence, and were undertaken within 
states that were not sufficiently involved in the activity of the 
NSA to satisfy traditional tests of attribution.221  As a result, the 
unwilling or unable doctrine sought to lower the threshold for 
what constitutes an “armed attack,” relaxed the standards for 
attributing NSA attacks to the territorial state, borrowed from 
the claims of “preventative self-defense” in perverting the 
concept of imminence even further, and seemed to incorporate 
elements of the law of state responsibility in an effort to bolster 
the justification for the use of force within the non-consenting 
state. 222 
Several of these moves should inform how we think about the 
arguments that may be advanced to justify expanding the jus ad 
bellum in the context of climate change.  Borrowing from the law 
of state responsibility may be most instructive here, for it is one 
of the explicit premises of the unwilling or unable doctrine that 
the territorial state stands in violation of the no-harm principle 
by permitting terrorist attacks to emanate from within its 
territory.223   Some of the more detailed and widely accepted 
articulations of the unwilling or unable doctrine have further 
implied that the responsibility for this violation of the no-harm 
principle adds to the justification for the use of force against 
NSAs within that state’s territory.224  I have argued elsewhere 
that this constitutes a conflation of state responsibility with jus 
ad bellum, and that it is entirely improper to use the law of state 
responsibility to bolster what should be an entirely jus ad bellum 
analysis.225  But this is instructive for how states may rely upon 
flagrant violations of the no-harm principle in the context of 
 
221 Id.  For my analysis of these issues, see Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra 
note 163. 
222  See generally Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 220; Martin, 
Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163. 
223 Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 220, at 773–74, 776. 
224 Id.  See also Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and 
the Use of Military Force, 4 U. CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 110–16 (2003); Martin, Unwilling or 
Unable Doctrine, supra note 163, at 429–30. 
225 Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163, at 429–33. 
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climate change for the purpose of bolstering the justification for 
collective action against the climate rogue state. 
The other moves made by the unwilling or unable doctrine are 
similarly instructive.  The doctrine of self-defense has 
traditionally contemplated the use of force against a state that 
is directly responsible for an armed attack.  That doctrine 
involves both a standard for the threshold of the use of force that 
rises to the level of “armed attack,” and requires a direct causal 
relationship between the action of the state and the harm 
caused.226  The latter is obviously satisfied in the event of a state 
launching an armed attack against another state, and thus 
remains merely implicit in the doctrine.  But where an NSA has 
launched an armed attack against one state from within the 
territory of another, the direct causal relationship is not clear 
and this implicit element thus becomes more important.  The 
ICJ has held that the defending state can only use force in self-
defense against the territorial state in which the NSA is 
operating, if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the NSA 
and the territorial state to support attribution of the NSA’s 
actions to the state.227  Moreover, the ICJ has held, and it is 
widely accepted outside of the United States, that for a use of 
force to constitute an armed attack triggering the right of self-
defense, it must be of significantly greater scale and intensity 
than the minimum level of force contemplated by Art. 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter.228 
The unwilling or unable doctrine undermines both of these 
elements of the doctrine.  First, it attempts to lower the 
threshold for armed attack by characterizing an accumulation of 
small strikes, none of which alone would rise to the level of 
armed attack, and which may have been launched by different 
but loosely affiliated groups, as together constituting an armed 
 
226 RUYS, supra note 207, 126–249, 368–510. 
227  See GRAY, supra note 164, at 139–45; RUYS, supra note 207, at 226 (discussing 
attribution for purposes of self-defense); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J., ¶¶ 194–95; Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J., ¶¶ 106–47. 
228 RUYS, supra note 207, at 139–49; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 191–95; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 
[2003] I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 64–72. 
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attack triggering the right of self-defense.229  Second, it almost 
entirely dismisses the standards for establishing a sufficient 
nexus for attribution, permitting the defending state to use force 
in and against the territorial state based solely on its own 
judgement that the territorial state is either “unwilling or 
unable” to prevent the attacks, regardless of the level of 
“involvement” the state has with the actions of the NSA. 230  
Given that state contributions to climate change are largely the 
result of non-state commercial activity, this weakening of the 
standards for attribution is again instructive of the kinds of 
arguments we are likely to see developed to justify the use of 
force against entities within the territory of climate rogue states. 
Finally, the unwilling or unable doctrine has borrowed aspects 
of the claims made in support of preventative self-defense in an 
effort to pervert the core temporal essence of the concept of 
imminence. 231   Two aspects of these claims are particularly 
relevant.  First, as with the arguments for preventative self-
defense, the doctrine embraces the idea that imminence is to be 
defined by reference to the degree of risk a threat poses—that is, 
the product of the probability that an attack may materialize, 
and the magnitude of the harm that it will cause—which is to 
confuse the concept of risk with that of imminence. 232   The 
second aspect does try to bring some element of time back into 
what is essentially a temporal concept, by claiming that a threat 
is imminent when the window of opportunity for preventing an 
armed attack is closing, even if the attack itself is not in the 
immediate future.233  I have argued elsewhere that while this 
 
229 Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 220, 774–75.  For some support 
for the “accumulation” argument, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 164, at 209–11; Contra 
GRAY, supra note 164, at 153–57; RUYS, supra note 207, at 168. 
230 Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163, at 423–26. 
231 Id. at 415–22. 
232 Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 220, at 775–76 ; Martin, Unwilling 
or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163, at 415–23; and for more on imminence generally, see 
Noam Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015); 
RUYS, supra note 207, at 250–54.  See also generally Noura S. Erakat, New Imminence 
in the Time of Obama: The Impact of Targeted Killings on the Law of Self-Defense, 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 195 (2014); Alan L. Schuller, Inimical Inceptions of Imminence: A New 
Approach to Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 161 (2014). 
233 Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against NSAs, supra note 220, at 775–776. 
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claim is not sufficiently rigorous, it is based on a legitimate 
intuition—that a threat may indeed be imminent, in the sense 
of requiring immediate action, if there is sufficiently compelling 
evidence to establish both that there is a very high probability 
that a specific attack will materialize, and that the last chance 
to prevent it is about to close. 234  Imminence, after all, is an 
element of the principle of necessity, and at the end of the day 
one has to prove that the use of force was the only alternative 
and last resort to prevent an attack.  There may be times when 
one can prove that a use of force is necessary now, just before the 
last opportunity to act has been foreclosed, in order to prevent a 
future harm from materializing.235  One can similarly see how 
such arguments might apply in the context of climate change, to 
support claims that the conduct of a climate rogue state 
constitutes an imminent threat that must be responded to now, 
because now is the last chance for preventing the state’s harmful 
conduct, even though the harm resulting from that conduct will 
not materialize immediately. 
Again, while I have criticized these claims in support of the 
unwilling or unable doctrine, they provide a strong indication of 
how similar arguments are likely to be made in support of 
expanding the doctrine of self-defense to deal with reckless 
contributions to climate change.  In the context of climate change, 
the claims will of course have to go much further, suggesting 
that that an armed attack (as that term is currently understood) 
need not be the triggering mechanism for self-defense at all, and 
that there need be no requirement to conclusively attribute the 
harm to the responsible state, or to establish a direct causal 
relationship between the conduct of the responsible state and 
the materialization of the threat.  However, the arguments 
advancing these claims will merely extend the logic and push 
the envelope of those already made in the context of the 
unwilling or unable doctrine, and they will benefit from 
arguments that have been made in the context of cyber 
operations. 
 
234 Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163, at 421–23. 
235 Id. 
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c. Response to Cyber Attack 
Another effort to expand self-defense came in response to the 
development of cyber threats.  The prospect of offensive cyber 
operations against institutions of the state has posed a 
significant challenge for both jus ad bellum and international 
humanitarian law (“IHL”).  Do such cyber attacks even come 
within the scope of either regime?  If so, when and how?  More 
specifically, in jus ad bellum terms, can a cyber attack constitute 
an armed attack justifying a use of force in self-defense?  These 
questions were tackled in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, 236  a text 
produced by an International Group of Experts invited by the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence to study 
the international law issues related to cyber operations.  It is 
considered one of the most authoritative articulations of how 
international law governs cyber operations.237  But it goes even 
further than the unwilling or unable doctrine in lowering the 
standards and broadening the scope of the elements of armed 
attack and attribution in the doctrine of self-defense. 
To begin with the concept of armed attack, the Tallinn Manual 
most significantly provides that an operation need not involve 
kinetic military operations or the use of weapons in order to 
constitute an armed attack.238  All that is required is that such 
an operation satisfy certain requirements of “scale and effect,” 
such that the consequences are sufficiently grave to be 
analogous to the effects of kinetic attacks, involving the 
destruction of property and infrastructure, and injury or death 
to individuals.  Indeed, some members of the Group of Experts 
were willing to go further, claiming that so long as the effects 
were sufficiently severe, the nature of the harm (that is, 
physically destructive or injurious as opposed to merely 
economically harmful) was not an essential element of the 
analysis.  What is more, as with the unwilling or unable doctrine, 
 
236  See generally INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt et al. eds., 
2017) [hereinafter, TALLINN MANUAL]. 
237 See, e.g., Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, Remarks on International Law and Stability 
in Cyberspace, at Berkeley Law School, DEPT. OF STATE (Nov. 10, 2016), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm [https://perma.cc/E7VH-TFT3]. 
238 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 236, at 340–41. 
MARTIN-MACRO-041820 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/20  12:26 AM 
394 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:S 
 
the Tallinn Manual accepted that the aggregation of a number 
of smaller cyber attacks, none of which alone satisfied the “scale 
and effects” test so as to constitute an armed attack by itself, 
could in the aggregate constitute an armed attack if the 
combined scale and effects of the operations were sufficiently 
severe.  Finally, the majority of the Panel of Experts concluded 
that intent was irrelevant to the question of whether operations 
constituted an armed attack.239  In other words, an intent to 
cause harm was not required in order to classify the operation 
as an armed attack, which has obvious significance in the 
context of climate change—states obviously do not intend to 
cause any specific harm by engaging in or permitting the conduct 
that is contributing to climate change, but if intent is irrelevant, 
then the threat or use of force in response to such harmful 
conduct becomes easier. 
Given how difficult it is to pinpoint the origin and authors of 
cyber attacks, and thus to attribute an attack to any particular 
state, the Tallinn Manual also grappled with the issue of 
attribution.  As with the kind of circumstances for which the 
unwilling or unable doctrine was developed, hostile cyber-
operations are frequently mounted by NSAs operating from 
within one state, and attacking the institutions in another state.  
The Panel of Experts took the position that the mere provision 
of sanctuary to such an NSA was not sufficient for attribution 
purposes, but that a state’s provision of sanctuary coupled with 
other acts such as the provision of some support or assistance, 
would be sufficient for purposes of attributing the acts of the 
NSA to the state.240  Nonetheless, notwithstanding this position 
on attribution, the majority of the Panel of Experts held that 
something akin to the unwilling or unable doctrine should also 
apply—that is, that even in the event that attribution to the 
territorial state is not possible, states may use force in self-
defense against NSAs responsible for cyber-operations 
comprising an armed attack if the territorial state is unwilling 
or unable to prevent the attacks.241  This was supported by the 
claim that states “have a duty to ensure their territory is not 
 
239 Id. at 343. 
240 Id. at 332. 
241 Id. at 347. 
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used for acts contrary to international law”—echoing the 
unwilling or unable doctrine’s invocation of the no-harm 
principle and incorporation of notions of state responsibility into 
a  jus ad bellum regime analysis.242 
The Tallinn Manual’s characterization of use of force and 
armed attack also includes factors that are more consistent with 
the traditional formulation of these two concepts.  For instance, 
the list of factors to be considered in assessing whether a cyber 
attack constitutes even a use of force, far less an armed attack, 
includes “directness,” “immediacy,” and “military character.”243  
Nonetheless, the Tallinn Manual’s characterization of armed 
attack and even the use of force itself, is a significant departure 
from the traditional understanding of these concepts.  Armed 
attack, in particular, has always been limited to kinetic 
operations involving weapons of some kind (even if that included 
the weaponizing of civilian objects, as in the 9/11 attacks).  
Similarly, the traveaux preparatoire and debates relating to the 
drafting of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter famously limited the 
concept of use of force to the use of military force.244  In contrast, 
in the context of cyber operations, the concept of armed attack 
can comprise any harm of sufficiently grave scale and effects—
even when that harm is the aggregation of effects from 
incremental operations—caused either by a particular state or 
NSAs operating within that state.  This is so regardless of any 
intent to cause harm, and it does not require kinetic attacks with 
weapons of any kind.  The Tallin Manual’s new and novel 
characterization of the concept of armed attack is highly 
suggestive of the kinds of argument we might foresee regarding 
the other ways this triggering mechanism might be stretched in 
order to encompass reckless contributions to climate change.  
Under the approach adopted in the context of cyber-operations, 
it is not that much of a stretch to argue that a state’s reckless 
contribution to climate change, in flagrant violation of its 
climate change law obligations, thereby causing harm to other 
 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 331–34. 
244 RUYS, supra note 207, at 60–67; Nico Schrijver, The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN 
Charter, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 191, at loc. 16049–
89. 
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states, could be sufficient to trigger an expanded right of 
collective self-defense. 
2. Unauthorized Collective Atmospheric Intervention 
While the foregoing illustrates the precedents that will likely 
be followed with respect to expanding the doctrine of self-defense, 
there is no question that such arguments will face serious 
resistance.  Indeed, these recent efforts to expand the doctrine of 
self-defense have themselves met with fierce opposition.  We can 
thus anticipate that efforts to expand the jus ad bellum regime 
in the context of climate change will simultaneously pursue an 
alternative and possibly easier path, again looking to recent 
efforts for guidance. 
The most likely alternative route will be to argue for the 
establishment of an entirely new exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force, for the very purpose of permitting the collective 
but unilateral use of force to prevent the excessive and unlawful 
contributions to climate change.245  There is precedent for this 
too, in the attempts to establish unilateral humanitarian 
intervention as a new exception.  As discussed earlier, there 
have been claims that there is an “emerging principle” of 
customary international law that permits the use of force by 
states to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide, or war 
crimes within another state, even in the absence of a U.N. 
Security Council authority—this is the unilateral form of the 
“humanitarian intervention” concept explored earlier.246  Some 
have argued that in the face of U.N. Security Council paralysis, 
the General Assembly ought to be permitted to authorize such 
action.  Others have gone further, to argue that the use of force 
for purposes of humanitarian intervention should be, and indeed 
is in the process of becoming, a third exception to the prohibition 
on the use of force.247  These claims have cited such instances as 
 
245  By “collective but unilateral,” I mean an exception that would require no prior 
institutional authority, but might require that states not act alone, but rather in 
coalitions of some specified minimum number of states. 
246 See generally, e.g., Harold H. Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law, 
111 AJIL UNBOUND 287, (2017); Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian 
Intervention”, supra note 192. 
247 For more on the debate, see, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention:  The 
United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  
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the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, and that of 
Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978, as examples of state practice 
evidencing the emergence of custom.248  The Secretary General 
of the U.N. raised the issue in his 1999 annual address, at once 
suggesting that some form of intervention might be permissible 
in some circumstances, but cautioning that clear criteria and 
conditions would have to be developed.249 
The more accepted view today is that an exception for 
humanitarian intervention is not yet an established norm of 
customary international law. 250   Indeed, there are strong 
arguments that such intervention not only remains unlawful, 
but also that it should emphatically remain unlawful. 251  
Nonetheless, a large amount of literature supports the claim for 
such a principle, and a number of governments have invoked it 
at various times—perhaps most recently when the U.K. 
referenced it as part of its legal position in support of a Security 
Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria, in 
2013. 252   All of this provides a precedent for yet another 
exception for forceful intervention within the territory of a rogue 
state for the benefit of all of humanity.  And, as discussed earlier, 
the rationales for a right of collective but unilateral 
 
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe & Roberr O. Keohane eds., 
2000); see also José Luis Aragón et al., Modern Self-Defense:  The Use of Force Against 
Non-Military Threats, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2018); supra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
248 See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 123–25 
(1991) (arguing that such claims have been rejected by the international community); 
FRANCK, supra note 184, at 171–72; Rodley, supra note196, at loc. 25281–25299 (Kindle 
ed.). 
249 U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (Sept. 20, 1999). 
250 GRAY, supra note 164, at 60.  See also Monica Hakimi, The Attack on Syria and the 
Contemporary Jus ad Bellum, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
attack-on-syria-and-the-contemporary-jus-ad-bellum/ [https://perma.cc/2d5v-q8ww]; 
Peter Tzeng, Humanitarian Intervention at the Margins: An Examination of Recent 
Incidents, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 460 (2017).  Kevin Jon Heller, “Genuine” 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention—Another Ticking Time-Bomb Scenario, 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
251 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretexts of War, 100 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 107 (2006); Heller, supra note 250. 
252 Prime Minister’s Office, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime:  UK Government 
Legal Position, GOV.UK (Aug. 29, 2013) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern 
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098/Chemical-weapon-use-by-
Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf [https://perma.cc/mtu5-3cwl]. 
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“atmospheric intervention” are in many respects stronger than 
the arguments in support of a unilateral right of humanitarian 
intervention.253 
What might we expect in terms of a framework for such an 
atmospheric intervention?  Harold Koh’s normative framework 
for developing a “better law” to deal with humanitarian 
intervention provides a particularly useful starting point. 254  
According to this model, a preliminary condition for any 
intervention (beyond, of course, first exhausting every and all 
non-forceful methods), would be that states seeking to take 
action must first seek U.N. Security Council authorization.  It 
would only be in the face of persistent vetoes or other forms of 
Security Council dysfunction, that other alternatives could be 
explored.  The next step would be to either obtain General 
Assembly authorization in line with the Uniting for Peace 
resolution approach discussed above; 255  or if that too is not 
feasible, then the approval and support of regional international 
institutions or arrangements, as contemplated by Chapter VIII 
of the U.N. Charter, 256  such as NATO, ASEAN, the African 
Union, or the OAS.  The underlying rationale for each of these 
checks would be to ensure that any action is undertaken 
collectively, and ideally with some form of collective institutional 
approval, so as to reduce the cynical exploitation of the doctrine 
as a pretext for actions by the invoking states to further their 
unrelated national interests.257  There might be a requirement 
for a minimum number of states to be involved to satisfy this 
condition of collective action.  A prohibition against unilateral 
individual action could thus be established as part of this 
exception. 
In addition to these limits, we might expect there to be a well-
developed framework of conditions and qualifiers to define and 
govern when such use would be lawful.  Thus, under this new 
 
253 By “unilateral” I mean not authorized by the UN, not that it is undertaken by one 
state acting alone.  As will be discussed below, if any such exception were to be embraced, 
it should be conditioned on the intervention being undertaken by some minimum number 
of states acting together—hence the phrase “collective but unilateral.” 
254 Koh, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 246. 
255 See supra notes 201–205 and accompanying text. 
256 U.N. Charter art. 52–54. 
257 Koh, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 246, at 289. 
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and carefully limited exception, for states to lawfully use force 
for purposes of “atmospheric intervention” such that it would not 
violate the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the Charter, they would 
have to establish that the use of force in question was limited in 
nature and genuinely for the purpose of forcing a climate rogue 
state to mitigate its recklessly excessive contributions to climate 
change; that the use of force was necessary and proportionate to 
address the specified threat posed by the activity of or within the 
climate rogue state in question (which would thus include the 
possibility of action against NSAs operating within the territory 
of the state); and that the use of force would terminate as soon 
as the threat had been so addressed.258  This would require a 
clearly established and articulated principle, integral to the 
exception itself, requiring the states relying upon this exception 
to provide persuasive evidence in support of each of the 
elements.259 
Now, each of one of these conditions raises a host of further 
questions, and no doubt, objections.  How on earth does one 
determine if the use of force is necessary?  How would one 
measure proportionality?  How could IHL be complied with in 
any such use of force?  And there are many more important 
questions.  We need not delve into all of these here—but this 
model and the questions it raises provide a good starting point 
for the coming debate, about how and why we should shape, limit, 
or utterly reject any adjustment of the jus ad bellum regime to 
deal with climate rogue states. 
IV. DEBATING AND RESISTING ANY JUS AD BELLUM 
ADJUSTMENT 
To this point, my argument has been primarily predictive.  I 
have explored why the climate change crisis will likely result in 
states reaching for the threat or use of force as a means of 
coercing climate rogue states into complying with international 
norms regarding climate change mitigation; and, through the 
lens of recent precedent, examined how arguments will likely be 
 
258 Again, this tracks the template of Koh’s humanitarian intervention framework.  Koh, 
supra note 246, 289. 
259 Id. 
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developed to expand the jus ad bellum regime to provide legal 
justifications for uses of force.  Some of these arguments will be 
persuasive, and more compelling than recent efforts to expand 
the jus ad bellum regime to deal other new and novel threats.  
But I have not been making a normative claim that the use of 
force should be relied upon to enforce international climate 
change law. 
In this Part, I turn to the normative implications of my 
forecasts.  My first and primary normative claim is simply that 
international lawyers, scholars, jurists, and policy makers 
should be thinking and debating now about why and how to 
shape, limit, and even reject and resist the coming efforts to 
expand the jus ad bellum regime.  My second normative claim, 
made in the interest of contributing to the initiation of that 
debate, is to suggest that we should indeed resist anticipated 
efforts to relax the jus ad bellum regime. 
A. Reasons for Resisting Change 
How should we respond to the anticipated arguments in favor 
of adjusting the jus ad bellum regime?  An obvious starting point 
might be to emphatically and categorically reject any effort to 
expand the doctrine of self-defense.  Notwithstanding the 
similarity to past efforts to expand the doctrine, permitting the 
unilateral use of force in self-defense against something that is 
not even a use of force, far less an armed attack, would be to 
weaken the prohibition and undermine the threshold for the 
justifiable use of force to an unacceptable degree.  It would 
introduce such ambiguity into the triggering mechanism for the 
use of force that it would excessively increase the risk of a 
radically higher incidence of international armed conflict.  
Notwithstanding the debate over the ambiguity that may have 
resulted from the putative adjustments to the doctrine for 
dealing with the very specific threat of cyber attacks, it would 
seem entirely justifiable to maintain the position that self-
defense is and should remain limited to the use of force in 
response to an armed attack, and that the definition of armed 
attack should not be distorted to contemplate such threats as 
excessive contributions to climate change. 
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That objection is to focus on a narrow and specific aspect of the 
anticipated efforts, but it hints at larger questions of risk 
assessment and how to measure benefits.  How should we assess 
the entire issue of possibly expanding the jus ad bellum regime 
to deal with climate rogue states?  It is perhaps helpful to back 
up and consider the purpose of the regime, and the potential 
costs and benefits of any adjustment in relation to that purpose.  
The jus ad bellum regime serves the fundamental purpose of 
preventing, or at least reducing the incidence of, international 
armed conflict.260  At its heart is the prohibition on the use of 
force.  Thus, any expansion of the exceptions to this prohibition, 
or to put it another way, relaxation of the regime’s limits, is 
likely to increase the risk of war.  It is precisely because of these 
risks that I have been highly critical of efforts to expand the 
doctrine of self-defense in the context of both preventative self-
defense and the unwilling or unable doctrine.261  The increased 
risk of more frequent inter-state armed conflict seemed a greater 
threat to the international system than the threat that the 
expansion or relaxation of the law was being advanced to 
address.  This was certainly so for the threat of transnational 
terrorism, but arguably so even in the case of responding to the 
development of weapons of mass destruction.  The marginal 
benefit to be gained by relaxing the jus ad bellum regime did not 
seem to come close to outweighing the risks it posed.262 
It is not at all clear, however, that these objections hold true 
in the context of climate change.  If the current legal regimes 
and institutions are not soon able to mobilize the necessary 
mitigation efforts—that is, if we are heading towards the 
scenario of a 2.5°C average increase by mid-century, and a 6°C 
average increase by 2100 263—then the risk posed to human 
civilization from the catastrophic consequences of climate 
change far exceeds the risk posed by international armed conflict 
(with the possible exception of a nuclear conflict between two of 
the super-powers).  From this perspective, the increased risk of 
 
260 See supra note 164. 
261 Martin, Unwilling or Unable Doctrine, supra note 163. 
262 Id. 
263  That is, the “severe” and “catastrophic” scenarios examined in Campbell & 
Parthemore, supra note 2; see supra Part II(A). 
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war caused by adjusting the jus ad bellum regime may be less 
threatening than the risk posed by not doing everything possible 
to force all states to comply with their climate change law 
obligations.  The question will then be, as the crisis deepens, 
whether the marginal benefit of allowing some limited use of 
force in some conditions, as a means of addressing the threat 
posed by climate change, would outweigh the risk of a higher 
likelihood of war in an increasingly chaotic international system. 
In some sense, the question is not yet sufficiently ripe for us to 
competently analyze and address.  In our current circumstances, 
the use of force to enforce compliance with climate change law 
likely seems entirely unjustifiable.  But my central predictive 
claim here is that as the crisis deepens, perspectives and the 
calculus will change.  In 2030 or 2040, when something along 
the lines of the “severe” climate scenario discussed above is 
materializing,264 how will the cost-benefit analysis for expanding 
the jus ad bellum look?  This will depend of course on how we 
assess the two sides of the cost-benefit analysis equation, which 
from today’s perspective is somewhat difficult to predict, 
particularly for one side of the equation.  On one side of the 
equation is the cost of increasing the risk of war by relaxing or 
expanding the exceptions in the jus ad bellum regime.  This is 
something we can and should be thinking about now, as that risk 
can be calibrated by how and to what extent any adjustment to 
the jus ad bellum limits are permitted.  In other words, to what 
extent should the “expansion” or “relaxation” be taken, and thus 
how much should we permit the risk of increased incidence of 
war to be raised; and how indeed can we assess the extent or 
gravity of such increased risk?  I will return to this “cost” side of 
the equation shortly. 
The “benefit” side of the equation relates to the risk posed by 
climate change, and the extent to which that risk can be 
marginally reduced by expanding or relaxing the rules of jus ad 
bellum.  This is the question that is much more difficult for us to 
meaningfully analyze now.  It is complicated because it has to be 
considered on two levels.  The first is the granular or particular 
level, meaning the specific benefit to be derived in the 
circumstances of using or threatening force to coerce the 
 
264 Fuerth, supra note 46. 
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behavior modification of a particular state.  The second is the 
more general effect on compliance that might result from 
establishing the very idea that excessive state contributions to 
climate change could be characterized as a threat to 
international peace and security, and that a range of collective 
action, up to and including the use of force, might be used to 
address such threats.  It is this second level that I want to focus 
on as being the far more important.  At the same time, in order 
to even contemplate the effect of an overall modification of the 
regime, we need to consider what the specific use of force might 
look like.  Indeed, many will argue that this is where the entire 
analysis may break down, for it is quite difficult to visualize how 
force could be effectively used to coerce a state to modify its GHG 
emissions or other climate change related policy.265  Thus, while 
the effect of the very existence of a climate change-specific 
expansion of jus ad bellum is of primary importance, we need to 
pause first to consider how force might be used, even if it is never 
actually employed but only ever threatened. 
The whole concept seems outlandish if we think of the 
contemplated use of force in terms of invasion and regime 
change.  And yet, when thinking about how force might be used 
to prevent a specific climate rogue state from engaging in 
recklessly excessive emissions, this might seem to be the option 
that comes most readily to mind.  The invasion of Iraq in 2003 
might be the most obvious precedent, but it will also seem an 
outrageous response to Canada announcing an expansion of its 
tar-sands oil industry or Brazil refusing to abate the 
deforestation of the Amazon.  But then how would a use of force 
be employed in this context?  We need to approach the issue with 
Clausewitz’ famous principle in mind:  that war is merely the 
continuation of policy by other means.266  That is, the use of force 
 
265 My thanks to Terry Gill, and other members of the LACMO workshop in Amsterdam, 
for focusing my attention on this question. 
266 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret et al. eds., trans., 
1976).  For an interesting discussion of the translation of this phrase, see James R. 
Holmes, Everything You Know About Clausewitz is Wrong, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/ 
[https://perma.cc/5j2m-z4z7].  Leaving aside the exact translation, there is no question 
that the phrase is often misunderstood—but the better understanding is that it means 
that war, as a means for achieving policy objectives, is limited by those objectives. 
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must be both tailored to and limited by the specific policy 
objective it is intended to achieve.  In dealing with a climate 
rogue state, the purpose of either a threat or actual use of force 
is to coerce the government to bring the state’s policy back into 
compliance with its international climate change obligations.  
This does not require massive “shock and awe” attacks or regime 
change—it is likely to be achieved through limited surgical 
strikes against precisely the infrastructure related to the non-
compliant conduct, as illustrated in my hypothetical example in 
the Introduction.  The more pertinent historical examples would 
be the Israeli surgical air strikes against the Iraqi nuclear 
facility at Osirak in 1981, 267  or again its strike against the 
Syrian nuclear facility in 2007.268  These strikes were unlawful 
under then prevailing principles,269 but they provide examples 
of the kind of limited strike that can both degrade the 
infrastructure posing a threat, and send a strong message to the 
government to change its policy.  Of course, in the event the 
strike is unsuccessful in modifying behavior, escalation may be 
thought necessary, and herein lies the risk of increased 
international armed conflict. 
In getting back to the cost-benefit equation, however, it is not 
the marginal benefit derived from any specific threat or use of 
force, or even the aggregation of such marginal benefits, that is 
the key benefit to be balanced against the cost of increasing the 
risk of war.  Rather, it is the benefit of the overall deterrent effect 
derived from establishing the possibility of some legally justified 
threat or even use of force against climate rogue states.  The 
point is that any use of force would be extremely rare so long as 
 
267 David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack Condemned by U.S. 
and Arab Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 9, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/ 
09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-
nations.html [https://perma.cc/2kxd-6t7x].  The efficacy of the strike of course remains 
hotly debated.  See generally, e.g., Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Revisiting Osirak: 
Preventative Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks 36 INT’L SECURITY 101 (2011). 
268 Amos Harel & Aluf Benn, No Longer a Secret:  How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Nuclear 
Reactor, HAARETZ (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/magazine-no-
longer-a-secret-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-nuclear-reactor-1.5914407 
[https://perma.cc/4vpj-f4gd]. 
269 FRANCK, supra note 184, at 105–06; Elena Chachko, The Al-Kibar Strike:  What a 
Difference 26 Years Make, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
al-kibar-strike-what-difference-26-years-make [https://perma.cc/ca7t-y69c]. 
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there are strict conditions developed for such use, and those 
conditions are adhered to.  The use of force has been rare (and 
typically unlawful), for instance, in dealing with states violating 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but arguably the prospect 
of such use has been a factor in mobilizing compliance with the 
regime.270  It would be difficult to assess such a general deterrent 
effect, and even more difficult to assess the marginal impact in 
any specific circumstance.  But if our collective failure to deal 
with the climate crisis continues—in that we are unable to better 
mobilize compliance with the obligations and norms of the 
international climate change law regime, and we cannot meet 
our collective objectives—then there is going to be an 
increasingly high value placed on that possible deterrent effect.  
In other words, a high value will be placed on adjusting the jus 
ad bellum regime so as to characterize reckless contributions to 
climate change as a threat to international peace and security. 
This account of putative costs and benefits might suggest that 
the efforts to expand the jus ad bellum might have some merit—
and when the time comes, I certainly think that such arguments 
are likely to become more persuasive and influential.  But before 
we can come to a landing on this, we need to return to the “cost” 
side of the equation, and to adjust the level of abstraction or the 
area of focus from which we are analyzing the problem.  One of 
the classic problems that plagues efforts at this kind of balancing 
of complex, typically unquantifiable and incommensurate risks 
and rewards, is a failure to cast the net far enough afield, and 
thus to miss some important second and third order costs in the 
calculus.  Some of the second and third order costs of any efforts 
to expand the jus ad bellum regime would involve direct injury 
to the regime itself.  Others would include negative 
consequences for other areas of the law and for the rule of law.  
When those are factored in (assuming for the moment that such 
a cost-benefit analysis approach is the appropriate means of 
judging the issue), 271  the cost benefit analysis tends to shift 
 
270 This is difficult to establish conclusively, but the U.S. government under multiple 
administrations have alluded to the possible use of force against Iran, Iraq, North Korea, 
Libya, and others, and one must conclude they thought it would be an effective incentive. 
271 Despite the objections of moral philosophers, such consequentialist and utilitarian 
cost-benefit analysis tends to inform much policy making.  For discussion of its 
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further towards the negative end of the scale.  I briefly explore 
some of these here, but there are surely others that will need to 
be considered in future debates. 
From a broad theoretical perspective, efforts to implicate the 
jus ad bellum regime for purposes of addressing climate change 
issues can be objected to as an impermissible move to “securitize” 
the global policy response to the climate change crisis. 272  
Securitization is a term that was developed in international 
relations and security studies theory to describe the process of 
framing issues in national security terms, and particularly in 
terms of existential threat, precisely in order to justify 
exceptional government policy and action that would otherwise 
violate regular political and legal norms. 273   There are 
exceptional circumstances that justify emergency measures, but 
the term securitization is typically invoked to critically describe 
dubious or even illegitimate moves to characterize challenges in 
national security terms for the purpose of circumventing 
existing norms.  The so-called “global war on terrorism” has 
surely taught us that all efforts at securitization should be 
treated with considerable suspicion.  Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever, in developing these ideas in the late 1990s, noted that 
environmental issues were at risk of being so securitized. 274  
Securitization is not only dangerous in terms of the negative and 
potentially unjust consequences that may directly result from 
the evasion of established regulation and standards, but also in 
the corrosive effect it can have on the entire system of norms and 
the rule of law itself.275  From this perspective, the predicted 
efforts to characterize contributions to climate change as threats 
to international peace and security, and to classify offending 
states as “climate rogue states” against which states may direct 
either the threat or use of force, would be to dangerously 
 
shortcomings, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE:  WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 
31–57 (1st ed. 2009). 
272 My thanks to Mark Taylor in particular for drawing my attention to this line of 
objection. 
273 BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 24–25 (1998). 
274 Id. at ch. 4. 
275 Id.  See generally Franziskus von Lucke et al., What’s at Stake in Securitizing Climate 
Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach, 19 GEOPOLITICS 857 (2014); Shirley V. 
Scott, Securitizing Climate Change:  International Legal Implications and Obstacles, 21 
CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 603 (2008). 
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securitize what should be an urgent public policy issue best 
solved through cooperation and coordinated collective action. 
One of the concrete problems with any effort to relax the jus 
ad bellum regime in order to address climate change aligns 
neatly with this securitization critique.  That is, any change to 
the regime for this purpose is not only going to increase the 
incidence of armed conflict legitimately initiated in accordance 
with the adjusted standards, but it will also increase the risk 
that any new standards will be cynically exploited as pretexts to 
disguise the illegitimate use of force.  This will be true whether 
the expansion comes in the form of changes to the doctrine of 
self-defense, the creation of a new exception to permit the 
unilateral and collective atmospheric intervention, or even the 
articulation of a specific new doctrine facilitating atmospheric 
intervention authorized by the U.N. Security Council.  This risk 
will be highest in the event that the doctrine of self-defense is 
relaxed, for reasons we have already discussed above, but even 
with an elaborate framework defining the necessary conditions 
for the exercise of atmospheric intervention, it will be 
susceptible to abuse.  Recall that many states and legal scholars 
have alleged that the humanitarian intervention in Libya in 
2011 was a pretext for regime change, and that NATO grossly 
exceeded the scope of the authority conferred by the U.N. 
Security Council resolution. 276   Indeed, advocates of 
humanitarian intervention strain to find a single example that 
is not vulnerable to allegations of ulterior motives, with even the 
Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1972 being subject to 
question.277 
This problem of possible illegitimate exploitation of any 
expansion of the jus ad bellum regime is compounded by the 
powerful suspicion that any resulting threats or uses of force will 
almost certainly be directed against weak states, particularly 
developing states in the Global South.278  Thus, it was far more 
plausible that my hypothetical in the Introduction should 
involve a surgical strike against power plants in Brazil, rather 
 
276 GRAY, supra note 164, at 3; see also Heller, supra note 251. 
277 See supra note 248. 
278 My thanks to Alonso Gurmendi for his thoughts on this point; see also Gurmendi, 
supra note 24. 
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than against those in Canada or Australia—although those 
countries are failing miserably in fulfilling their current climate 
change obligations and both have some of the highest per-capita 
and historical GHG emission totals in the world.279  Brazil may 
be among the top fifteen contributors of carbon dioxide in the 
world, but its overall historical responsibility for contributions 
to climate change is considerably less than that of most other 
developed countries. 280   On one level, the likely use of force 
against weaker states merely reflects the real politik of modern 
international relations, and may not be so different from the 
dynamics around the current operation and enforcement of the 
jus ad bellum regime more generally.  After all, Russia remains 
in Crimea, Israel has held the occupied territories for over fifty 
years, and we could safely wager that there will never be a 
humanitarian intervention to prevent atrocities in Xinjiang.  
But in the context of climate change, the development of a 
doctrine that would be disproportionately employed against the 
Global South would compound some of the deepest equity and 
justice problems inherent in the very nature of the climate 
change crisis, and the structure of the climate change law regime 
itself. 
One of the most central and intractable equity and justice 
problems in the response to climate change is the concept of 
differentiation of responsibility and capability.  The least 
developed states are the least responsible for climate change, in 
terms of both cumulative historical emissions and current 
contributions, yet they will feel the consequences of climate 
change soonest, are most vulnerable to the consequences, and 
are the least capable of adapting to or protecting themselves 
from those consequences.  In contrast, to state the obvious, the 
 
279 See, e.g., Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(July 16, 2008), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions 
[https://perma.cc/W79L-HWQ3]; Per Capita CO2 Emissions, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017), 
https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#per-capita-co2-
emissions [https://perma.cc/HKA6-2YZL]; Top 12 CO2-Emitting Countries & Their Per-
Capita Emissions (2004), WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Nov. 2008), https://www. 
wri.org/resources/charts-graphs/top-12-co2-emitting-countries-their-capita-emissions-
2004 [https://perma.cc/LCA6-3ANK]. 
280 See, e.g. Le Quéré et al., Global Carbon Project, OUR WORLD IN DATA (May 2017), 
https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions#cumulative-co2-
emissions [https://perma.cc/5Z9R-HLB6]. 
MARTIN-MACRO-041820 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/20  12:26 AM 
2020] Atmospheric Intervention 409 
 
countries that are the greatest contributors to climate change 
are not only least vulnerable and best able to adapt to the risks, 
they are also the most powerful.  The five permanent members 
of the U.N. Security Council are all among the most responsible 
for climate change, and the United States has announced its 
intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement.281  
The apparent inequities and injustice of this situation have been 
one of the stumbling blocks in climate change law 
negotiations.282  Expanding the jus ad bellum regime to help 
enforce climate change law will merely compound this problem.  
Force will be used by states that are themselves potentially 
guilty of being climate rogue states, disproportionately against 
weaker developing countries that are in overall terms less 
responsible than other developed states.  This would exacerbate 
perceptions of profound injustice.  Such developments could 
serve to seriously undermine the global cooperation that is so 
essential to overcoming the collective action problems inherent 
in the crisis. 
Another basis for objecting to the entire idea of atmospheric 
interventions, regardless of whether it is authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council, is that it is difficult to conceive of how such an 
intervention could be launched without violating fundamental 
principles of the jus in bello regime or international 
humanitarian law (“IHL”).283  This regime governs the conduct 
of armed forces within armed conflict. The first act of any use of 
force for purposes of an atmospheric intervention would trigger 
the operation of IHL, and the conduct of forces in executing the 
intervention would be governed by its principles.284  One of the 
 
281 See Press Statement of Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-
from-the-paris-agreement/. 
282 MAYER, supra note 76, at 98–105; BODANSKY, supra note 76 at 100–05. 
283  Also known as the law of armed conflict.  See generally YORUM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed., 
2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014); THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (Dieter Fleck ed., 2013). 
284 Though there has been a lively debate recently over whether the “first strike” in 
limited interventions is governed by IHL or international human rights law.  See, e.g., 
Alonso Gurmendi, Raising Questions on Targeted Killings as First Strikes in IACs, 
OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 9, 2020) http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/09/raising-questions-on-
targeted-killings-as-first-strikes-in-iacs/ [https://perma.cc/59WE-T938]. 
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four core principles of IHL is the principle of distinction, which 
requires armed forces to distinguish between combatants and 
civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects.285  
Given that the entire premise of atmospheric intervention is 
that the use of force would be targeted at infrastructure or 
facilities directly related to the contribution of GHGs, it is highly 
unlikely that such targets could be legitimately characterized as 
anything other than civilian objects.  What is more, there would 
be significant risk that civilians would be present.  The knowing 
violation of the principle of distinction, in the form of deliberate 
targeting of civilians or civilian objects, is considered a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions, and thus a war crime.286  And 
this is only the starting point of a far more extensive analysis of 
ways in which the contemplated atmospheric intervention could 
potentially run afoul of the principles and rules of IHL.  Without 
delving into the details here, this is one more way in which the 
adjustment of the jus ad bellum regime could undermine the 
integrity of other legal regimes. 
In sum, these additional consequences of the possible 
adjustment to the regime (and there are surely more), some of 
which would negatively impact other legal regimes and corrode 
the international rule of law more generally, would together 
tend to undermine the global efforts to develop and coordinate 
law and policy responses to the climate change crisis.  For these 
reasons, when taking these broader factors into consideration, 
the balance of risk and reward tilts against any relaxation of the 
constraints of the jus as bellum regime. 
B. Time for Debating Change is Now 
If there is a reasonable chance that there will indeed be 
pressure to adjust the jus ad bellum regime, and regardless of 
what normative position one may take on the issue, then now is 
the time for debating and even acting on these issues.  Now, 
 
285 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 44, 48, 51, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-
BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
11–24, 79–101 (2005). 
286 DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 283, at 123. 
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while the crisis is still on the horizon and the idea of using force 
to combat climate change still sounds rather bizarre, rather than 
waiting until the crisis deepens and the pressure for change 
actually starts to manifest itself, when the debate is going to be 
shaped by a sense of urgency, fear, and deeply felt national 
interests. 
It is also important to have the debate now to provide time to 
act on the conclusions.  If, for instance, the prevailing normative 
view is that the predicted efforts to relax the jus ad bellum 
regime should be resisted, then the time is nigh for considering 
and developing possible pre-commitment devices and other 
restraining mechanisms to help entrench and protect the 
current legal architecture.  In constitutional theory, there is an 
idea that constitutional structures can serve as “pre-
commitment devices.”  These are mechanisms designed to 
constrain future government behavior in circumstances of crisis 
or emergency, when decision-makers may be tempted to act in 
ways that are contrary to the nation’s fundamental values and 
principles.287  The metaphor commonly employed to capture the 
idea is taken from the story of Odysseus in Greek mythology, 
protecting himself from succumbing to the fatal spell cast by the 
Sirens’ song by having himself bound to the mast and his men’s 
ears stopped with wax.288   Treaties have been recognized as 
operating as precisely this kind of pre-commitment device at the 
national level, and even as a way of reinforcing and locking-in 
democratic norms.289  There has been less work done on how one 
might think of creating pre-commitment devices to entrench and 
strengthen the resilience of international law norms at the 
international level.  I have in the past written on how 
constitutional incorporation of jus ad bellum principles could 
 
287 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
(1979); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 
96–101 (2001); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
288 ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 287. 
289  Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law:  Starting a 
Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2059–60 (2003); see generally Tom Ginsburg, Locking 
in Democracy:  Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 707 (2006). 
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help strengthen that regime.290  It strikes me that if we can 
foresee extreme pressure on the jus ad bellum regime coming 
over the horizon, we should be thinking creatively about ways 
we might develop mechanisms of one form or another that could 
help to entrench the current principles and protect them from 
such pressure. 
Finally, there may be some collateral but potentially 
important consequences of having this debate now.  If we step 
back from the details of these arguments, and allow only the 
broadest strokes of the image to remain in focus, we may be 
struck by just how impotent we are as a species to deal with an 
existential crisis of our own making.  Not only international law 
but all of our institutions are proving incapable of responding to 
the challenges.  The idea that we would consider going to war to 
stop carbon emissions seems crazy, and yet it reveals the failure 
of everything else.  One of the central reasons for our collective 
failure is our inability to make a critical mass of the public 
understand the magnitude of the crisis.  Having very public 
debates on policy options that help to illustrate the severity of 
the threats, and the more appalling and morally reprehensible 
the options we will confront the longer we delay, may help to 
influence public opinion.  This idea is reflected in a recent 
scientific proposal to dam the North Sea to protect England and 
several countries in Northern Europe from sea level rise.  While 
met with skepticism and disbelief, one of the authors noted that 
while it is not an ideal solution, it might serve as an alarm, 
“vividly illustrating the kind of drastic action that might become 
necessary if global leaders cannot find a way to address climate 
change.”291  As one recent essay put it, if we could blame climate 
change on aliens, it would be easier to solve. 
 
290 For my own work on thinking about incorporating into domestic constitutions the 
principles of the jus ad bellum regime for this purpose, see Craig Martin, Taking War 
Seriously:  The Case for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force in Compliance 
with International Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 611 (2011). 
291 Claire Moses, As Sea Levels Rise, Scientists Offer a Bold Idea:  Dam the North Sea, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/world/europe/north-
sea-dams.html [https://perma.cc/56FL-KHET]; for the report, see Sjoerd Groeskamp & 
Joakim Kjellsson, The Northern European Enclosure Dam for if Climate Change 
Mitigation Fails, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y (forthcoming 2020), 
https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/BAMS-D-190145.1?referringSource=article 
Share& [https://perma.cc/FHB6-VETC]. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
I have gone to considerable effort to predict why and how there 
will be increasing pressure to relax the jus ad bellum regime, 
and have suggested that the arguments driving such pressure 
will be persuasive, only to end by calling for a rejection of the 
arguments and for resistance to the pressure.  But I think that 
the issue is worthy of consideration precisely because the logic 
and intuitions underlying the coming arguments are so 
powerful—notwithstanding the objections I have laid out, and 
the many more beside that others will no doubt raise.  Let us 
return to consider the width and sharpness of the line separating 
necessity and self-defense.  In the Introduction, in the context of 
the case of R. v. Dudley and Stephens, 292 I raised the question of 
how we might think about the available justifications and 
defenses if Richard Parker,293 the cabin boy who was murdered, 
had been doing something that had incrementally threatened 
the lives of the other seamen in the lifeboat.  Let me expand on 
this line of thinking to develop a thought experiment that brings 
us closer to our situation in the face of the climate change crisis.  
Imagine a scenario from a science fiction movie in which some 
twenty astronauts are in a spaceship returning to Earth.  They 
are still six months from arriving, when the engineering officer 
determines that they are short of water.  Given the current 
water supply and the limited daily output of the water generator, 
each person will have to be limited to just one cup per day for 
the rest of the voyage home.  To exceed this will mean that some, 
possibly all, will die.  They all agree that rationing is thus 
necessary, but there is no way to isolate or lock off the many 
access points to the water supply, or otherwise prevent cheating.  
 
292 R. v. Dudley and Stephens, [1881-85] All ER Rep. 61, (QBD, UK). 
293  The name, incidentally, of a character who is stranded at sea and eaten by his 
companions in an Edgar Allan Poe novel, the Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, published 
in 1837, and also the name of the tiger in the popular novel The Life of Pi by Yann Martel.  
Martel has acknowledged that the book takes part of its inspiration from the case. See 
Carl Thompson, Cannibalism at Sea:  Sailors Ate the Cabin Boy, HIST. EXTRA:  BBC HIST. 
MAG. (May 20, 2014), https://www.historyextra.com/period/cannib 
alism-at-sea-sailors-ate-the-cabin-boy/ [https://perma.cc/4AVU-AU9D]; Rick Spilman, 
Nautical Coincidence & Lifeboat Morality—Richard Parker and the Migonette, OLD SALT 
BLOG (Jul 19, 2012), http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2012/07/nautical-coincidence-lifeboat-
morality-richard-parker-and-the-mignonette/ [https://perma.cc/AJ6D-VTY5]. 
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And indeed, while most of the astronauts are making an effort, 
many are exceeding their ration to some extent, putting them all 
at risk. 
Then, with five months remaining, it is discovered that one of 
the senior officers is not only drinking more than his one cup a 
day but also has been wasting water to wash each day.  With 
each reckless use of water, he puts all of the crew, and himself 
as well, at risk of dying before the ship arrives home.  After all 
efforts at persuasion and other acts to prevent his use of water 
have been tried, would a use of force by the rest of the crew not 
be warranted?  Could such a use of force only be defended on 
grounds of necessity, or would it begin to look more like self-
defense?  Would the fact that most of the crew had also been 
exceeding their ration to some extent undermine the powerful 
sense that action was required to stop the far more reckless 
actions of the rogue officer?  Even if a court would later 
determine that necessity was no defense, no matter how terrible 
the temptation, would we not expect and predict that the crew 
would use force against the rogue officer in any event?  In short, 
I have not developed this hypothetical as a means of justifying 
either an expansion of the doctrine of self-defense or that of 
necessity, but merely to note that some situations will leave 
people with the powerful sense that force is both necessary and 
justifiable, and thus create strong pressure to bend existing 
doctrine to the task of legitimizing their actions.294 
It is interesting to note that the Queen’s Bench Division, in 
rendering its decision on appeal of the trial verdict in R. v. 
Dudley and Stephens, went to some lengths to emphasize that 
Richard Parker was entirely innocent and that he had posed no 
risk to his assailants, thereby highlighting the bright line 
between necessity and self-defense.  However, the court also 
 
294 It has been suggested that this thought experiment suffers from the same problems 
and flaws as the ticking time-bomb hypothetical developed to justify torture.  But, 
leaving aside the problem that its premises and assumptions can almost never be 
satisfied in real life, the ticking time bomb-hypothetical is employed to distil and isolate 
a proposed principle for purposes of guiding and justifying a particular public policy; this 
thought experiment is not offered as a justification of any policy option or doctrine, but 
merely to illuminate the indistinct nature of the line between defense and necessity, and 
to highlight the pressure for a use of force in some circumstances. 
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ended with an almost anguished recognition of the harsh 
operation of the principle it was enforcing: 
 
It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be 
an excuse for a crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation 
was; how awful the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the 
judgment straight and the conduct pure.  We are often compelled 
to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down 
rules which we could not ourselves satisfy.295 
 
While the modern international law reflects this common law 
principle, in that the principle of necessity cannot be invoked as 
a justification for the use of force,296 the circumstances of the 
climate crisis will blur the lines between necessity and self-
defense.  The ICJ itself gestured towards this blurring of the line 
in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which 
the plurality held that it could not rule out the possibility of 
using nuclear weapons in self-defense, notwithstanding possible 
IHL violations, if the survival of the nation was at stake.297  
While we may not have yet begun to fully recognize it, our 
situation is rather quickly developing into one similar to my sci-
fi hypothetical.  We know the range of temperature increase that 
will put our civilization at risk, and we have a very good idea of 
how much of an increase in the volume of GHGs in the 
atmosphere will result in such a temperature increase.  
Reducing our collective emissions is proving enormously difficult, 
and the publics of most countries have yet to comprehend either 
the extent of the challenge or the enormity of the risks.  But as 
the consequences of climate change start to really bite in the 
coming years, and the waves of the crisis begin to really break 
upon the shores of our collective consciousness, the fear will set 
in and the demands for action will rise to a fever pitch.  Those 
demands will include calls to take action, including the use of 
force, against those states that are seen to be recklessly and 
 
295 R. v. Dudley & Stephens, [1881–85] All ER Rep. 61, 67–68 (QBD, UK). 
296 CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 18, at 274–80, 305–15 (2013); see also 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
1/56/10 at art. 25. 
297 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶¶ 95–97 (July 8). 
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unlawfully adding to the existential threat faced by humanity.  
Those climate rogue states, like the water-wasting astronaut in 
my hypothetical, will be viewed as putting all of humanity in 
jeopardy, and a use of force against them will begin to look and 
feel more like an act of self-defense than merely an act of 
necessity, regardless of the fact that those calling for action will 
not have entirely clean hands. 
My primary argument here has been merely predictive.  I 
claim that such demands for the threat or use of force will likely 
be made as the crisis worsens, and that these demands will be 
accompanied by arguments that such a use of force can be legally 
justified.  Pressure will be raised to adjust the jus ad bellum 
regime in order to expand the exceptions to the prohibition on 
the use of force.  We have seen the precedents for precisely those 
kinds of claims all too recently, in response to the perceived 
threats posed by states developing weapons of mass destruction, 
transnational terrorists operating from within weak states, 
cyber attacks, and governments perpetrating crimes against 
humanity against their own populations.  The logic for relaxing 
the restrictions on the prohibition against the use of force is 
actually more compelling in the context of climate change than 
it was for any of those other threats.  The risk posed by those 
allegedly novel threats was far outweighed by the risk of 
increasing the incidence of international armed conflict by so 
expanding the jus ad bellum regime.  That is not necessarily so 
in the case of climate change.  The risk posed by the 
consequences of climate change is increasingly recognized as 
constituting an existential threat, and thus could in principle 
justify some marginal increase in the risk of war caused by 
adjusting the jus ad bellum regime. 
Again, however, while I acknowledge that these arguments 
will likely become more compelling than those mounted in 
response to other threats in the recent past, I have tried to 
explore how the balance of risk and reward tends to tilt more 
heavily in the direction of excessive and unacceptable risk, once 
we expand the scope of our analysis so as to consider the broader 
and unintended consequences of any such relaxation of the 
regime.  My contribution to the debate that I hope this article 
will help to initiate, is to suggest that any such effort to relax the 
regime should be resisted.  But precisely because these 
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arguments are coming, we need to begin thinking about them 
now.  Now, before the fear and crisis are upon us, we need to 
consider how best to resist the worst of these arguments, and 
possibly how to fashion and establish some pre-commitment 
devices or other mechanisms to help entrench and protect the 
existing principles of the jus ad bellum regime.  Rather than “set 
up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules 
which we could not ourselves satisfy,” to borrow the language 
from R. v. Dudley and Stephens, we should turn our minds to 
establishing standards and rules that might be realistic enough 
to modify state behavior, and actually limit the worst 
temptations to come.  What is more, starting such a discussion 
now might help change the way we think of the coming climate 
change crisis—helping to persuade publics that, unless we begin 
to take drastic action, climate change is going to be catastrophic, 
and the worst threat to international peace and security that we 
have ever seen. 
